Amendment to Section 3 of the Police Act, 1861

Amendment to Section 3 of the Police Act, 1861
15.54 The constitution of such a Commission will, in our opinion, help considerably in making police performance politically neutral. While retaining governmental responsibility for overseeing the police, this Commission will ensure that this responsibility is discharged in an open manner with publicly known policy directions and guidelines. The arrangements of an annual evaluation report from the same Commission and constant review of the functioning of the police by it would also further ensure that police performance in any given period has conformed to the prescribed policy directions and guidelines and has served public interests in the best possible manner. We recommend that the limits of supervisory responsibility of the State Government in regard to police performance as observed in para 15.36 to 15.38 above, and the constitution of a State Security Commission as proposed above to help the State Government in discharging this responsibility may be spelt out in a new provision in the Police Act .in replacement of the existing Section 3 of that Act
Intelligence wing of the police15.55 A sensitive area of police functions with considerable scope for misuse of police relates to collection of intelligence. Under the garb of having to collect intelligence regarding matter & which have a bearing on the law and order situation and internal security in the State, the intelligence wing of the State Police frequently collects a variety of information regarding activities of political parties and individual politicians. It is a fact that the style of functioning of certain political parties and individuals with certain political ideologies has sometimes led to disturbances to public order. Collection of intelligence regarding activities which are likely to lead to such situations becomes a necessary part of the preventive functions of the police. The assessment whether the activity of a particular party or group or individual is likely to lead to a public order situation as such, is sometimes made by the police functionaries in the intelligence wing, not on their own judgment but on directions or indications emanating from the political leadership in Government at a given point of time. When this assessment is made at the instance of the political executive, it is likely to be coloured by political considerations in preference to the actual requirement of the interests of the public or the State as such. This very often leads to misuse of the intelligence wing to collect intelligence in political matters, not strictly relatable to public order or internal security. In this context, the Shah Commission of Inquiry has referred to some aspects of the functioning of the Intelligence Bureau and the Central Bureau of Investigation at the Centre and has pointed out the need for appropriate safeguards to be evolved to ensure that these organisations are not put to misuse by the Government or some one in the Government. We would like to point out that the tendency to misuse these organisations would get accentuated by political instability in Government and, viewed from this angle, the functionaries in these organisations would need protection from improper and unhealthy pulls and pressures that might operate in such situations. We understand from the Ministry of Home Affairs that (hey have recently received the Report of the high level Committee headed by Shri L. P. Singh, a former Home Secretary and presently Governor of Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura, which was appointed in pursuance of the observations of the Shah Commission of Inquiry regarding the Intelligence Bureau and the Central Bureau of Investigation. The points (hat may emerge from the analysis of L. P. Singh Committee Report would, in our opinion, be applicable in a substantial measure to the working of intelligence wing in the State Police as also the State Anti-Corruption agencies. We recommend that Central Government may communicate to the State Governments the essential observations and recommendations emanating from the L. P. Singh committee Report for their information and further action to regard to their own agencies, not only for overseeing their performance but also for protecting than from unhealthy influences.