Togather We Can

understanding radio industry

2011-05-01T01:37:00.001-07:00

http://www.slideshare.net/edwardlawsonbtectvandfilm/understanding-the-radio-industry
http://www.slideshare.net/RockyS11/english-for-journalistsdoc

SriLanka won the World cup finals..

2011-03-27T03:10:00.000-07:00

I wish India could beat Pakistan in Semi, but I know this time it would be SL who will beat Pakistan in the Finals...
When Cricket in India and cricketers as well would come out of Cricketer 'syndrome'. Untill and unless the cricketers do not start playing cricket out of passion instead of fashion they would never be able to present a confident, dependable and consistency in the matches...
Pakistan cricketer has show consistency and the confident they play with on the field is remarkable... Day by day they have improved and have come out of the shadow of match fixing... They have gained a lot and I can see the will gain this time too. But It would be Srilanka who is going to make it in the finals...

So Lets welcome the new World Champions. SL and congratulates us to be part of Asia where this time the trophy comes back afte 1996... and they are the SL againss

Observe things and learn

2010-04-26T07:46:00.000-07:00

One thing I would like to share... It is about observation and learning... and one of my friend Deepak Sharma. I was in eigth class in Jammu. During one of our sports period, it was football ground and as usual we have have to divide our classmates into two teams... everyone wanted to be part of the team which has good players... I was one of them. But to surprise Deepak always played for the team which seems weak and later I followed him and felt the changes... One good reason I found that he do not like few who were good players and another yet to explored. But he gave me a lesson. Play for the weak team you will not only hone up yourself but also work hard to prove you capacity and capability. You will read the strong opponent more clearly and improve accordingly...The result, Deepak outshines in many matches as good defender and he was in for the school football team. Later because of him I was inducted in the school team when I was in eleventh at Bikaner KV. I played as left forward player...

ACCOUNTABILITY OF POLICE PERFORMANCE

2010-03-06T22:08:00.000-08:00

Our experience in the preceding three decades after independence has shown that a Constitutional system of Government based on democratic principles cannot function without the support of an effective, efficient and accountable administration. Constitutionally, the political executive i.e., the Minister has been made accountable for the performance of the bureaucratic executives under him. We feel that such undiluted ministerial responsibility is not in the interest of either administrative efficiency or the people sought to be served by the administration in the present conditions. Responsibility of the political executive or the Cabinet in the Assembly is too broad to afford relief to the people who have no access to the channels of power. It is, therefore essential that the accountability of the bureaucratic executive at the various levels be defined and a degree of immediate proximity to the people introduced. The concept of anonymity of the bureaucratic executive cannot wish away the necessity for fixing his accountability for the performance of his duties. While the above is true for the entire administrative machinery, it has an extra significance for the police organisation which is entrusted with the task of preservation of the basic order in society which is essential for the stability of a Constitutional Government. Unlike the other executive wings of the Government, the police has maximum visibility. Visibility by itself waters down anonymity. The accountability of the police has to be viewed in this light.Accountability means answerability for the proper performance of the assigned task. It means more than mere responsibility to discharge the duties involved in a job and includes that the discharge of duties shall be to the satisfaction of the party for whose benefit the duties are being discharged. Therefore, accountability pre-supposes two parties, one under obligation to render account for the proper performance of the task assigned and the other having a right to ask for and receive such an account. While the party who renders account has perforce to be unitary, the party which has the right to ask for and receive the account may be multiple. It may be within the organisation or outside.It is, therefore, essential that the departmental functionaries should know clearly the source of authority to which they have to account for their performance. A clear understanding of the concept would indicate to them their various roles and functions the level of expectations and the limits and constraints within which they have to function. A similar understanding is essential on the part of the source of authority to which the police is accountable. Lack of understanding by either side will result in misplaced goals and objectives and consequent displacement of accountability.This leads us naturally to the next issue as to whom the police is accountable. In a democratic society, each department of the Government including the police is ultimately accountable for its performance to the people. However, direct accountability to the people in a society like ours may prove difficult. It has, therefore, been constitutionally laid that the public service is accountable to the elected representatives of the people at the forums of Parliament and State Legislatures through the Minister/ Ministers concerned. We have already stated that in the modern world ministerial responsibility of this kind waters down the administrative efficiency and fails to provide the necessary satisfaction to the people. It has become urgent and essential to devise new mechanisms of accountability to ensure a certain amount of direct responsibility to the people at the various levels of administration.While the ultimate accountability is to the people, the police have a proximate accountability to the law of the land, which in essence is the expression of its will. As the prime law enforcing agency, the activities of the police not only centre around the enforcement of various laws, but their free functioning is also governed by the processes of laws. The action of the police is, therefore, confined to the laws of the land while enforcing the same. Every stage of their activity is given, governed and judged by provisions of law. In this area of accountability to the law of the land the police activities come under very close scrutiny of the judiciary. In other words, the accountability to the law is ensured by judicial review at several stages.61.6 Apart from the above two sources of authority to which the police is accountable they have a direct accountability to the organisation. This accountability is ensured under the various regulations and departmental procedures apart from the inspections and periodical review of administration.61.7 We have spelt out in the preceding paragraphs the three-fold accountability of the police i.e. to the people, to the law and to the organisation. We would emphasise that the concept is in fact inter-related and ultimately points to one and the same principle The laws are the collective will of the people expressed through various legislative bodies and put into a formal shape. The department functionaries are bound to act according to the laws as enacted. Finally, it is the people who have created and authorised the supervisory hierarchy of the department to control and direct the functionaries at police station and other levels so that the latter discharge their statutory duties in accordance with the procedures established by law.
Accountability to the people61.8 As stated earlier, at present the concept of total anonymity of the bureaucratic executive and undiluted ministerial responsibility to the people has resulted in distortions affecting police efficiency and citizen-satisfaction. Unfortunately, therefore, the concept of ministerial responsibility has given the wrong impression to the political executive that they are authorised to guide and intervene in all functions of the police in all areas regardless of such guidance or intervention being in accordance with or in contravention of the law of the land. We have brought into clear focus in our earlier reports the harm this has done to the people. We wish to emphasise that it is ultimately the people whose agents the police functionaries are and to whom they are ultimately accountable. Realisation of this concept in our opinion, is of vital importance. We however, find that the process of the police accountability to the people has suffered considerable distortion in the recent past. Various pressure and elite groups have come to develop in society having infinite expectations from all Government departments including the police and seeking favours to the exclusion of legality and fair play. These are members of State and Central Legislatures, the local bodies, important functionaries of political parties, particularly the ruling ones, representatives of the local, yellow press, other important persons of the locality and Government servants holding important positions, who have tended to divert the police accountability from the people to themselves. Police functionaries, therefore, also have tended to shift their priorities on to these pressure groups. This has had obvious effect on the attitude of the common people themselves, who feel that the public services including the police service are meant only to serve the elitist groups and in case they wish to avail of any public service, they have to purchase it through illegal gratification or secure it through exercise of pressures from power-wielding sections of the society.61 9 Another distortion noticed by us is preferential attention of the police to the urban areas at the cost of the rural areas. Since the urban population is more vocal and more demanding, the public services have tended to neglect the rural population. We understand, in several States, departmental instructions provide compulsory stay of district level officers in the rural areas for at least 90 days every year. We notice that these instructions are seldom complied with. Police functionaries of and above the level of Dy. Supdt. of Police/SDPO, therefore, do not come into contact with the rural population as frequently as they should. The rural areas are neglected except for completing the rituals of supervision and inspection. Therefore, the police officials appear to be out of touch with the problems and difficulties facing the vast majority of the people, residing in the villages. In this context, we would strongly recommend strict compliance of the existing instructions and would emphasise that officers of the level of SDPO and SP must reside in the rural areas for at least 90 days in a year Such stays would help them to come in close contact with the common people, know their problems in full and seek their cooperation in various police activities. It will also provide opportunity to police officers to meet representative sections of society and discuss various problems facing the people at large.61.10 The assessment of the police performance has two facets — the-first facet consists of the examination of records during inspections, which constitutes the visible part of accountability as prescribed. More important is the invisible part which can be gathered only by interaction with the people by the inspecting officers. This interaction will enable them to assess the actual qualitative performance of policing, its impact in that area on citizens and the feeling of security. It is, therefore, essential that officers should not make such inspections a routine drill but introduce such fraternisation as is deemed fit so that the interaction with the public will enable them to elicit the maximum possible information about the views of the people in regard to the functioning of the officials in the area.61.11 At present the Annual Administration Reports of the State Police are compiled on the basis of statistics and information collected from the various levels in the organisation. This report attempts to present a picture of the standard of policing within the State during a specific period, usually a calendar year, but generally it bases its conclusions on the basis of the statistics, emanating from the police stations. The report is submitted to the State Government who review it and along with its conclusions present it to the Assembly for discussion. In actual practice, in most States there is a considerable time lag between the date of submission of the report before the Houses and the period to which it relates.61.12 We have recommended in our Second Report that the evaluation of performance of the State Police would be one of the tasks assigned to the State Security Commission The aforesaid Annual Administration Report of the State Police will naturally be an important document to aid the State Security Commission in the evaluation of the performance of State Police. But we feel that this document is not enough for an objective assessment. It is based on the statistics, which, as we have more than once observed in our previous reports, are unreliable on account of the fact that there is considerable burking of crime. Further, the Annual Administration Reports generally project only a quantitative assessment. It is not possible to have an accurate idea of the qualitative satisfaction of people from such reports. We, therefore, recommend that the State Security Commission be also provided an independent Cell to evaluate 'police performance, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. This Cell should not be a part of the police and may include experts from other disciplines according to requirements. In addition to the two reports mentioned above, the State Security Commission would also be receiving an assessment report, though not so detailed regarding the state of policing from the Central Police Committee recommended by us in our Seventh Report. In our view, these three reports, each emanating from different channels, should provide a reliable base to enable the State Security Commission to assess the police performance objectively and with an amount of certainty, enough to inspire public satisfaction. The State Security Commission will thus be adequately equipped to prepare its own assessment of the performance of the State police, to be placed before the State Legislature.61.13 The preparation of the final report, to be put up before the Legislature by the State Security Commission itself will lend the report greater acceptability. The Commission will consist of not merely the Home Minister but Members of known integrity and impartiality drawn from various cross-sections of society who would have no temptation not to call a spade a spade. At the same time, the system suggested by us will bring to the notice of the Home Minister a more reliable and more detailed picture of the State policing and will thus enable him to take the necessary corrective steps thereby helping him to discharge his responsibilities as a Home Minister in a much better manner.61.14 We would have liked the accountability of the police to the people to be made more direct and visible by vesting the power in the people to ensure accountability directly to the people themselves. But in a representative democracy like ours we are aware that ensuring such a direct accountability, though desirable, is beset with various difficulties. We are, however, convinced that it is not impossible to introduce a near direct accountability of the police to the people whom they serve. This does exist in a way even today. The Superintendent of Police of a district and the Range DIG get regular feed-back from the people and the press. This enables them to assess the performance of the officers at the Station House and other operational levels.61.15 What we desire is to create the awareness of direct accountability to the people at the various levels in the police hierarchy. In other words, this awareness of accountability to people should not only permeate the system but the officers individually as well as in groups should be sensitized to the idea of the importance of accountability to the people. We have stressed this aspect in our Chapter on 'Training of Police Personnel' also.61.16 Inspections are instrumentalities in introduction of direct accountability to people Officers, therefore, have to take inspections seriously and make them more meaningful by conscious and constant interaction with the people. They should not hesitate to meet the people and the press, nay, they should seek out people during their inspections to get the necessary feed-back to assess the functioning of operational level policing. This should be both at the district and at the Station House level. During the inspections the Inspecting officers should call meetings of the cross-sections of the people and discuss their problems with them. At the district level they should hold meetings not only with the cross-sections of the people but with the representatives of the people at the Municipal, Zila Parishad levels and with the MLAs and MPS of the constituency.61.17 During inspections the inspecting officers should devote special care to scrutinise and review the overall pattern of complaints that are received. If a complaint of a particular kind is repeated or frequent complaints are noticed from a particular area the Inspecting Officer should investigate into the causes. Selective inspection should be carried out so that the complaints as well as the reasons therefor could be ascertained in detail.61.18 We would like to lay emphasis on the point that officers at the level of Superintendent of Police and above should be required to watch the reputation of Station House Officers. Responsibility in this regard must be squarely fixed on them and any failure on their part in this regard should be viewed seriously. However, there may be circumstances where the supervisory ranks may either fail to assess the reputation of the SHO or fail to take appropriate action even after a case of bad reputation has come to their notice. In such circumstances, the people have a right to petition to the State Security Commission. In such cases the State Security Commission should cause appropriate enquiries to be made to gauge the reputation of the SHO concerned and take such action thereafter as may be required.61.19 We have in our earlier Chapters expressed the hope that the future police station will not merely be a point of crime control and prevention but will develop into a service centre. At present, people hesitate to go near police stations but with the introduction of training we have recommended for the police personnel, and the quality of recruitment we have envisaged and the constant sensitising of the police personnel to the problems of the people by the superior officers, it should be possible to convert the police stations into 'service centres' for people with problems.61.20 When the Range DIG or the Supdt. of Police of the district feels that a particular station house or operational level policing is not giving the necessary satisfaction to the people, he should go into the causes in depth and try to remove the same. If the attitude of a particular Station House Officer or his methods of functioning are not in the interests of the people of the locality, the higher officers should not hesitate to shift the officer from that particular area and to take such corrective or disciplinary action against him to mend his attitude and behaviour.
Accountability to Law61.21 The principal criminal laws in the country are the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. There are also some special/local laws making certain acts penal offences. The Police Act which is one of the special laws spells out powers functions and duties of the police.61.22 The Police Organisation is subject to the superintendence of the State Government We have analysed the nature of this superintendence in our Second Report in paragraphs 15.36 to 15.42. We have explicitly mentioned therein that "the investigative tasks of the police are beyond any kind of intervention by the executive or non-executive." Therefore, so far as the police-activities pertaining to investigation of offences are concerned, they have professional independence whereby they are to be entirely governed by the provisions of law. No authority except the supervisory ranks of the police themselves are authorised to issue an executive order to the police official to investigate or not to investigate a criminal offence, arrest or not to arrest an alleged offender or decide a case under investigation in a particular way. Any executive instructions issued in this regard would be contrary to the law. With regard to preventive tasks and service oriented functions, we have said that "in the performance of preventive tasks and service-oriented functions, police should be subject to overall guidance from the Government which should lay down broad policies for adoption in different situations from time to time. There should, however, be no instructions in regard to actual operations in the field. The discretion of the police officer to deal with the situation within the four corners of the overall guidance and broad policies should be unfettered."61.23 The police accountability, therefore, is to the law as established by the people in all areas of law enforcement. In the area of investigation they are exclusively governed by the laws, both substantive and procedural. They are not subject to the directions of any authority not recognised by the law. In other areas of law enforcement, the police accountability continues to be to the law as enacted. In the latter areas, however their functions are subject to such broad policies as may be laid-down under the law by the recognised authorities. Even here the broad policies can be laid-down only under the law and not beyond or against it.61.24 Although the laws are ultimately the wishes of the people themselves, neither the people nor the elected representatives have any authority to intervene or interfere in the activities of the police in the discharge of the duties under the laws once enacted though the people through elected representatives may amend the law if they deem so necessary.61 25 The above-mentioned factors are essential for ensuring police accountability to law ; but we observe that there has been a continuous erosion by undue interference in the exercise of the discretionary authority and statutory duties of the police. Extraneous interference is damaging the police accountability to law. In this context Professor David H. Bayley expressing his views on the subject has observed :—"In India today a dual system of criminal justice has grown up — the one of law the other of politics. With respect atleast to the police, decisions made by the police officials about the application of law are frequently subject to partisan review or direction by elected representatives. This autonomy of police officials in specific and routine applications of law has been severely curtailed. This is not only true of law and order situations. People accused of crimes have grown into the habit of appealing to political figures for remission from the sanctions of law. Police Officers throughout India have grown accustomed to calculating the likely political effect of any enforcement action they contemplate. Fearing for their careers and especially their postings, they have become anxious and cynical. But everywhere officers expect to be held personally accountable by politicians even more than by superior officers for enforcement actions taken in the course of duty."He has further observed —"Altogether, then, the rule of law in modern India, the frame upon which justice hangs, has been undermined by the rule of politics. Supervision, in the name of democracy has eroded the foundations upon which impartiality depends in a criminal justice system."The findings of Prof. Bayley support our own observations of the situation in the country.61.26 While police functionaries have been accorded wide powers under the law, many of them affecting the freedom and liberty of an individual, provision has also been made for strict scrutiny by the courts over the manner in which the police exercises these powers. Almost all preventive and investigative activities of the police are Subject to scrutiny by law and adverse observations by courts on police conduct call for a mandatory enquiry attended with follow-up action. At the same time any member of public who feels that the police in a particular situation has acted contrary to the law, can move the courts for redress. In order to secure fuller accountability of the police to the laws, we have already recommended in our First Report, mandatory judicial inquiry into certain categories of police "misbehaviour" through a District Inquiry Authority. We have in the same report also recommended creation of a Complaint Cell under the District Superintendent of Police and Special Cells under the Range Deputy Inspector General of Police an Inspector General of Police to handle complaints against the police personnel.61.27 On occasions, however, it is seen that false and frivolous complaints are made against police officers before criminal courts, to embarrass and demoralise them so that they desist from taking stern action against an offending party. Sometimes such complaints are got filed through third parties by influential persons who have a grouse against the police but do not themselves want to come out in the open. They only make funds available and exercise their influence to create and produce evidence. Law takes notice of such vexatious prosecutions and has provided protection to police officers, as also to other Government servants, for acts done or purported to be done in the discharge of their official duties.61.28 Section 132 of Cr.P.C. 1973 gives protection to members of the armed forces of the Union, executive magistrates and police officers against prosecution for acts done under section 129, section 130 and section 131 Cr.P.C. which relate to dispersal of unlawful assembly by use of force etc. According to sub-section 1 of section 132, no prosecution can be launched against a police official except with the sanction of the State (Government. Section 132(2) provides that police officials acting under good faith in connection with dispersal of unlawful assembly would be deemed to have thereby committed no offence.
61.29 Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. provides protection to judges, magistrates and all public servants not removable from their office except by or with the sanction of the Government. Thus no court is authorised to take cognizance of an offence against a public servant, if the alleged offending act has been committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of duties, except with the previous sanction of the State Government. Sub-section 3 of section 197 empowers the State Government to make any class or category of members of the force charged with the maintenance of order immune from prosecution except with the previous sanction of the State Government.61 30 The difference between the provisions of the above two sections are firstly that while section 132 Cr.P.C. gives protection to police officers of all ranks, section 197 Cr.P.C. generally covers only the officers who are not removable from their office save by or with the sanction of the appropriate Government. Secondly, section 132 Cr.P.C covers only acts purported to be done under section 129, 130 and 131 Cr.P.C. while the other section provides for omnibus protection for all acts done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty.61.31 The above provisions in actual practice seem to have made neither the public nor the police officer happy. The public feel that the restriction placed by the law are dilatory and undue. Obtaining permission for prosecution from the competent authority takes considerable time and the consequent delay provides an opportunity to the accused police officer to suborn witnesses and even pressurise the complainant. The common man feels that he should have an unfettered right to seek redress for an injustice done to him by a public servant, from a court of law. The police officers, on the other hand, feel that the law as it has been interpreted and applied hardly provides them any protection worth the name. The police officers, whom we met, repeatedly drew our attention to many occasions when they got no legal protection, even though the acts in question were done in the discharge of their duties.We have given anxious consideration to the two opposite views stated above While we feel that on the one hand the police officers are exposed to frivolous prosecutions and there is need for help from the Government so that they do not feel helpless or abandoned, we also at the same time see merit in the plea that the public should be free to seek the verdict of a court of law if he has a grievance against a Government servant.Section 197 Cr.P.C. suo moto makes a distinction between officers not removable save by or with the sanction of the appropriate Government an other ranks of police officers. Though in some States (like Delhi) the protection has been extended to other ranks charged with the maintenance of public order under the provisions of sub-section (3) of this section, we see no justification for making a distinction between the various ranks of police officers and would like the recommendations which we will be making in this chapter later on to be made applicable to all ranks equally.Police has vast powers which may affect even the liberty of an individual. Stigma attaches to any person, action against whom is taken by the police. Similar powers are not enjoyed by officers of other departments and hence we feel that the police should also have a greater measure of accountability. The public complainant should, in our opinion, be free to press his complaint against a police officer for a judicial pronouncement without there being a need to obtain permission from any body. At the same time we feel the necessity for certain measures for the protection of police officers against vexatious and frivolous prosecutions. While we advocate that the public complainant should have the liberty to go ahead with his case in a court of law, we would recommend that the police officer should be defended at the cost of the Govt. According to the existing rules and instructions in some States the permission of the Government has to be obtained for such a defence. We do not consider this to be necessary. We feel that officers of and above the rank of Superintendent of Police should be empowered to order defence of their subordinates. The Government orders should be necessary only in cases when a complaint is filed against an officer of the rank of Inspector General of Police or Director General of Police and also in case the complaint against the police officer is of rape or murder. Such defence at Government cost should extend upto the appellate stage. We have examined the propriety of the suggestion that in case the officer is convicted by a court of law, the expenses incurred by the Government in such cases should be recovered from him. In the case of conviction of a Government servant he will automatically be subjected to some other departmental penalty which may extend up to his dismissal. We think that such a departmental penalty should be enough and the recovery of expenses would not be necessary.We have considered another suggestion which was made to us, namely, making it obligatory for the public complainant to deposit a certain amount of money along with his complaint in the court of law which amount should be subject to forfeiture in the event of the complaint being found false. We think that such a provision will prevent the weaker sections of the society from going to courts for the redressal of their grievances. As an alternative, we feel that in case the court comes to a finding that the complaint is unfounded, it should by law be empowered to take the explanation of the complainant and if it finds the explanation unsatisfactory, it should have power to inflict suitable punishment on the complainant. The Law Reforms Commission appointed by the Australian Government in its Report on 'Complaints against police' has recommended that "where the complaint filed against a police officer concerning action taken by him is false or misleading in a material particular, it should be treated as an offence punishable with fine upto Rs.500 or/and imprisonment upto six months". We are in general agreement with this approach and would suggest the introduction of a suitable legal provision in this regard. We would also add that it might be impressed upon courts by the High Courts concerned that such complaint cases against police officers should be disposed of on a priority basis. Delay not only causes frustration to the complainant but also brings the police force as such into disrepute. Further, we would suggest that the High Courts might draw the attention of the lower courts to the provisions of section 202 Cr.P.C. and advise them generally to ask for a report from the District Superintendent of Police on the complaints filed before them. It should be the responsibility of the District Superintendent of Police to either make an inquiry himself or have it made by a sufficiently senior officer and submit a factual report to the court before the court decides to proceed further with the case. Objectivity of such a report must be ensured at all costs and there should be no attempt to white-wash or cover up the lapses. A fair and impartial report will enhance the confidence that the court may repose in police.
61.36 We would like to add a word of caution in this regard. Sometimes the main purpose of filing a complaint in a court of law is to secure the transfer of the officer concerned and once the transfer has been ordered, the complainant loses interest in the case. We feel that on mere filing of a complaint transfers should not be made unless there is a prima facie case and justification for the same.
Organisational accountability 61.37 In the system of accountability internal to the organisation also we have noticed equally serious drawbacks which have led to distortions and which would require suitable corrective measures. In a hierarchical system like the police, accountability is determined at various levels with reference to the next higher level. For instance, the SHO is accountable for his individual performance as well as collective performance of the Police Station to the Superintendent of Police. So far as the performance appraisal of individual functionaries are concerned, we have dealt with that in a separate Chapter in our Seventh Report. In this Chapter we are confining ourselves to evaluation of collective performance. This is because in our opinion individual performance appraisal requires a more detailed and exclusive discussion and the evaluation of group performance may be more appropriately dealt with in the context of police-accountability. Evaluation of group performance is conducted by various levels of supervisory police officers by the exercise of periodic inspections. For instance the District Superintendent of Police inspects police-stations under his charge periodically. Similar inspections are carried out in respect of the District Police by the D.I.G. and the Chief of the State Police. We note that the yard-sticks adopted for evaluation of group-performance are generally similar in most States with regard to the major areas of police activities. For instance the most commonly used parameter relates to assessment of police efficiency by comparison of crime-statistics of the period under review with those of the previous years. If the number of offences registered during the period under review is more than those in the preceding years, a facile conclusion is drawn that the police of the area has failed to control crime. Firstly, statistics of reported cases of crime do not reflect the true position regarding police efficiency, as the police by themselves do not exercise control over all crimogenic factors. Secondly, adoption of this parameter leads to large-scale non-registration of offences at the police station level. Since free-registration of all cases reported at Police Station would mean swelling of crime figures, under-registration at the Police Station level has become a prevailing practice. We would like to add even at the risk of repetition, that supression of crime-statistics is not a malady afflicting the Police Station level only ; it has taken into its sweep the supervisory authorities at all levels also. Since the crime situation is discussed every year on the floor of the State Legislatures primarily on the basis of crime statistics, State Governments in the majority of the cases are also interested in presenting a rosy picture of crime incidence Therefore, the State Governments and the senior police-officers frequently connive at under-reporting of cases. 61 38 Another commonly used parameter is the so-called 'preventive measures' taken by the police during the period of review. Incidence of reported offences under Local and Special Laws is generally considered to be an index of the extent to which 'preventive measures' were taken by the police. The higher the number of reported cases under Local/Special Acts (e.g. Police Act, Arms Act, Excise Act, Gambling Act, Supression of Immoral Traffic Act etc.), the more creditable it is considered to be for the police. The logic behind this practice appears to be that the acts punishable under Local and Special Laws are the breeding-grounds for more serious offences and the arrest and prosecution of offenders at this stage acts as a deterrent against major offences. The obvious flaw in this assumption cannot escape notice. But more than that, adoption of this determinant of evaluating police performance leads to large-scale and unwarranted arrests, and initiation by police of false cases against innocent persons.Another yard-stick adopted in some States pertains to police-encounters with the gangs of dacoits and robbers. Total number of encounters during the period of review total number of criminals apprehended and killed in police-encounters, fire-arms etc recovered from the outlaws are the parameters by which the police efficiency is assessed This yardstick also often leads to police staging fake encounters and at times killing of criminals after they are caught by the police. Fire-arms are often planted in the hands of dacoits and to acquire them, unscrupulous police officials connive at the illicit manufacture of such fire-arms.The above are the most frequently used yardsticks on which the police efficiency is assessed. A few other yardsticks common to all States are —(i) Recovery of stolen property during the period of review, as compared to previous years;(ii) Successes in investigation of offences determined by the percentage of chargesheeted cases to those registered by the Police during the period of review;(iii) Successes in criminal cases in the courts of law determined by percentage of cases successfully convicted to those decided, etc.In adopting these determinants, a lack of correlation between the determining factors and yardsticks which are supposed to measure police efficiency is apparent. But more than that, these parameters encourage the police to adopt questionable means of recording and controlling crime and even resorting to illegal acts. One modern yardstick adopted in some big cities is the 'response-time' which is the time-lag between the receipt of a call by the police and the arrival of the police at the place of the caller But we note that the average response-time of the police-car in big cities does not provide a realistic picture, as the police records appear to be manipulated frequently to show a quicker response-time.Due to a faulty system of monitoring police performance at various levels, we have come across a number of odd situations. For instance, in one major State the sense of security in the community has been lacking during the last decade or so, but crime statistics create an impression that it is a very peaceful area. In another major State there is a similar situation, but the crime figures of today in that State are much below those recorded 10 years back. In this State several thousands of dacoits have been shot dead during the police encounters during last 5-6 years, but the dacoity menace remains unchecked.Great harm has been caused to the image of the police department due to laying down of faulty determinants for evaluating police performance, which has led to a misplaced sense of accountability and questionable methods of crime control adopted by police. In our opinion, the parameters of performance evaluation act as reference points for determining police-performance which ultimately help delienate the coordinates of police accountability. Therefore, we have addressed ourselves to the possible yardsticks which may be the desirable indicators of police performance. While determining these yardsticks we have two considerations in our view :—(a) that these should help the authorities to have an objective evaluation of police performance ;(b) these yardsticks should not encourage the police to resort to extra-legal methods.
We recommend the following determinants to be adopted by the State Police organisations :—(1) Prevention of Crime :(i) Sense of security prevailing in the community.(ii) People's willing cooperation and participation secured by the Police in preventing crime.(2) Investigation of Crime :(i) Correct registration of crime (ii) Prompt visit to the scene of occurrence (iii) Speedy investigation (iv) Honesty and impartiality in investigation.(3) Law and Order:(i) Extent to which law and order is maintained, taking into account the forces which promote lawlessness.(ii) The manner in which law and order is maintained. Two factors have to be judged — (a) People's cooperation, (b) Use of force.(4) Traffic Management: (i) Smooth flow of traffic in urban areas and control of fatal and serious accidents by prosecution of persistent offenders.(5) Service :(i) General spirit of service, especially to weaker sections, physically handicapped, women and children.(ii) Quality of service rendered in a distress situation like cyclone-havoc flood-damage, famine etc.(iii) Specific instances of service-oriented functions performed by the Police which drew special appreciation and gratitude from the public.(6) Reputation of integrity and courtesy :(i) General reputation.(ii) Police collusion with criminals organising illicit distillation, gambling economic crimes, prostitution etc.
(iii) Reputation for courteous behaviour (iv) Prompt and satisfactory enquiry into complaints against policemen.However, the problem likely to be faced in this connection by the police authorities will be fixation of specific determinants to evaluate the performance of the police relevant to each of the above-mentioned heads. These determinants would have to be evolved in due course after some experimentation and experience.61.43 With regard to the departmental accountability, we would like to lay down as a guiding principle that a functionary in the department at a particular level should be held accountable only with respect to functions and duties assigned to him ; conversely the accountability should not extend to duties over which he has no direct control. Such duties and functions are assigned to police-officers at various level from time to time by virtue of various laws and departmental rules. Great damage has been done, in our view, by not taking note of this important principle, and holding functionaries at each level (e.g. SP. DIG and IG) responsible for everything happening throughout his jurisdiction. To elaborate our point, the IG is responsible for generally maintaining law and order throughout the State, generally maintaining integrity and morale of the force, personnel management including training of personnel etc. But he cannot be held responsible for each isolated incident in a particular district unless it is proved that the particular incident occurred because of some acts of omission or commission on the part of the Chief of Police, or such incidents have been widespread and the latter has failed to react adequately. In a similar manner, it would be wrong to hold the SP or the SHO accountable for each isolated incident in their respective jurisdictions.61.44 Finally, with regard to the departmental accountability we strongly disapprove of the practice of fixing unreasonable or impossible targets which cannot be achieved except through irregular or illegal means. Examples of these are the categories of orders to 'reduce' crime within a fortnight, or clear the area of outlaws, particularly dacoits and robbers, within a short time or to create a sense of security in the community within a similar period or to work out a sensational offence within an unreasonably short time. More often than not, these are the very orders which induce policemen at the Police Station level to resort to such unlawful means as indiscriminate arrests, adoption of third-degree methods, staging fake encounters etc. Often targets of the kind indicated above are promised by the Government in the State Assembly after a hue and cry has been raised regarding law and order/crime situation in a particular area or in the State. Such instructions filter down to the Police Stations through the various levels of police hierarchy. In our opinion such instructions and directions which are instrumental in creating a distorted sense of accountability among the police functionaries should be controlled effectively and avoided.61.45 The necessity for accountability of the police organisation is not far to seek. As mentioned earlier, it is too much to expect the political executive alone to account for the acts of the Government departments under their control and the individuals in those departments. The very remoteness of the political executive from the grass-root functioning of the Governmental agencies makes it imperative that the accountability has not only to be defined but prescribed precisely for various levels of the Government organisation. Again the concept of ministerial responsibility to the people through the Parliament and Assemblies presupposes anonymity of the Governmental agencies. In progressive democracies, the concept of anonymity has given way to direct accountability of the various constituents of the Government to the people.61.46 We want to emphasise that accountability can be ensured only by active supervision. Accountability also depends upon the awareness of the people of their rights and their willingness to exercise the same in a responsible manner by activating the mechanisms worked out by us. At the same time that awareness should also include clear understanding of the limitations and constraints within which the police has to function. Police on their part should also clearly understand that the ultimate accountability is to the people and to the people alone. Their accountability to law and to their organisation are only complementary to the ultimate objective of accountability to the people. If the people are not prepared to assert their rights through the various agencies prescribed by us apart from the Courts, if the State Security Commissions are not established, if the media remains biased and not constructive and inspections continue to be a farce, nothing much can be expected from the mechanism of accountability.

Conduct Rules for Police in india

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In regard to the representations or information which elected representatives of the people may have to communicate to Government servants (including the police) existing instructions emphasise that while the Government servants should consider carefully and listen patiently to what the elected representatives may have to say, they (i.e. Government servants) should always act according to their own best judgment.
These instructions are contained in the following references :(i) Government of India, Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, letter No. 25/19/64-Ests (A) dated 29th April, 1975 addressed to Chief Secretaries of all the State Governments.(ii) Circular No. PMG-1075/XVIII(0&M) dated 25-11-1975 issued by the Government of Maharashtra, General Administration Department.(iii) G. 0. Ms. No. 976 dated 24th May, 1969, issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu, Public (Services A) Department, Madras to all Heads of
Departments.In this context it will be relevant to refer to rule 3(3) of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968, which is reproduced below :"No member of the Service shall, in the performance of his official duties or in exercise of powers conferred on him—(i) act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior and he shall obtain such direction in writing, wherever practicable, and where it is not practicable. he shall obtain written confirmation(ii) evade the responsibility devolving legitimately on him and seek instruction from, or approval of, a superior authority when such instruction or approval is not necessary in the scheme of distribution of powers and responsibilities.
The same rule is embodied in rule 3(2)(ii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. However, this does not find a place in the Conduct Rules in several States which are applicable to the police personnel. We would recommend the adoption of this rule in the Conduct Rules applicable to police personnel of all ranks in all States.
Code of Conduct for Legislators15.63 The conduct of Government servants (including the police) can be controlled and guided by the issue of rules and instructions and enforcing then strict compliance in actual practice. If, however, the political functionaries, whose conduct is not subject to such rules and regulations, do not change their present attitudes and approach to this matter, their inclination to interfere with the executive including the police will continue in some form or other. While on one side we may be thinking of several remedial measures to enable the executive to resist this interference, our objective can be achieved in a substantial measure only when the political functionaries also change their style of functioning.
In the Government of India, Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms letter No. 25/19/64-Ests. (A) dated 29th April, 1975, addressed to the Chief Secretaries of all the State Governments, it was indicated that a Code of Conduct of Legislators was being separately processed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Our enquiries reveal that this Code of Conduct for Legislators has not yet taken any shape. We recommend that the Ministry of Home Affairs complete their exercise expeditiously and have the Code issued very soon so that the elected representatives as also the general public at large may know and appreciate the requirements of ethics and propriety in this important and sensitive matter. We also trust that the contemplated exercise on the political plane as decided at the Chief Ministers' Conference of 6th June, 1979 [vide para 15.19 above) will be taken up in right earnest and completed soon.
Declaration by police personnel at the time of appointment15.64 To bring home the primacy of the rule of law in a democracy and the paramount duty of every police officer to recognise this primacy and stoutly resist any interference with the course of his duties as enjoined by law and in accordance with the Constitution, we feel it would be appropriate if every member of the police is made to swear or solemnly affirm a declaration embodying this fundamental principle, at the time of his joining the police, whatever be the rank of entry. Police regulations in States do not envisage any separate affirmation or declaration by police officers, but in common with other Government servants they are required to sign a simple declaration proclaiming their allegiance to India and to the Constitution of India as by law established.
We feel that something more positive is required on the part of a police officer and would, therefore, recommend the following form of declaration :—I, A B, do swear/solemnly affirm that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to India and to the Constitution of India as by law established; that as a member of the police in the State of—————I will honestly, impartially and truly serve the people without favour or affection, malice or ill-will; that I will to the best of my ability, skill and knowledge discharge, according to law, such functions and duties as may be entrusted to me as a police officer, and in such a manner as to uphold and protect the dignity and rights of the citizen as proclaimed in the Constitution.
^Apart from the initial declaration at the time of joining the police, it would further serve the purpose and embed the principle firmly in the minds of all the police officers if this declaration is remembered and repeated by them in groups and assemblies of police personnel drawn up on an annual ceremonial occasion like the 'Police Commemoration Day* which is observed on 2 lit October, every year.
Training15.65 The sustained capacity of the police system to function as an efficient and impartial instrument of law will largely depend on the attitudes developed by the personnel at different levels in the system and the manner in which they respond to different situations in their career. This in turn depends on the training which they get at the time of their entry into the system and in the subsequent lead and guidance they receive from the leadership at various levels within the system. The structuring of the initial training courses and the later in-service training courses for all police personnel should be suitably designed to facilitate the growth of proper attitudes and sense of values on the part of every police officer, viewing himself throughout as a servant of law to uphold and protect the dignity and rights of every individual fellow citizen of the country. We shall be referring to this aspect m greater detail when we deal with the subject of training for police officers.
Conclusion15.66 In recommending the various measures in this chapter for minimising, if not eliminating, the scope for interference with or misuse of police by pressures from political, executive or other extraneous sources, we have placed great hopes equally on politicians and police personnel and trust they would look at these measures objectively and see in them a mechanism for rendering genuine public service. We earnestly believe and trust that our expectations will not go in vain and, recalling the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, we hope the politician as well as the police would be "brave enough and wise enough to grasp this opportunity and accept the challenge of the future".

Oral orders to police in india

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.60 Situations arising from oral orders issued by the supervisory officers including the political executive, while on tour or otherwise, are known to cause considerable embarrassment to the field officers when the orders happen to require the commission of illegal, irregular, improper or unjust acts. A few State Governments have issued instructions in the recent past for the guidance of officers to ensure proper conduct. The purpose these instructions is that the officer receiving such oral instructions should make a record of the instructions and get it confirmed by the superior officer concerned. We are aware that an administrative apparatus would get badly cramped and become ineffective in day to day service to the public if it is rigidly insisted that no functionary need take action under orders from a higher ranking functionary in the normal line of supervision unless the order is in writing. Several situations may occur in daily life in which a supervisory functionary on the spot may give oral orders for immediate execution by the subordinate functionaries concerned. Several such situations be easily imagined in law and order matters. We ace, therefore, not in favour of enunciating any rigid role that every order that flows from one level to the tower level in administrative hierarchy should be in writing before the intended action is taken. While oral orders cannot be shut out totally from the administrative system, they can and should certainly be avoided in situations which do not involve any element of urgency and can wait for the oral orders to be confirmed in writing before the intended action is initiated. Our recommendation would, therefore, be that—(i) oral orders should be avoided as far as possible and may be resorted to only in situations which call for immediate executive action and cannot wait for the issue of written orders in confirmation of the oral order;(ii) a record of every oral order be kept both by the issuing officer and the recipient officerin the relevant files; and(iii) a subordinate officer receiving oral orders from a higher ranking officer shall be entitled to ask for and get confirmatory orders in writing from the higher functionary, for record.
Interaction between elected representatives and the police15.61 In any democratic system we must have with the executive at different levels for bringing to the notice of the executive whatever information the elected representatives may have in which they feel the need for some kind of corrective action in the interests of justice. We must keep open all scope for such interaction. Persons subjected to flagrant injustice by executive action will be inclined to share their grief and disappointment with several others in public including the elected representatives and will expect them to do something to set matters right While conceding the need for interaction between elected representatives and the executive in such situations, we are anxious to ensure that this does not lead to unauthorised interference as such with the performance of the executive. We, therefore, feel that if as a code of conduct it is laid down that elected representatives will interact with the police at the level of the Deputy Superintendent of Police or above only it would avoid situations in which the executives at the operational level in police stations and circles may be overawed by the stature of the political functionary and may be inclined to accept and act upon whatever information he passes on to them without making the necessary check and verification which they might make normally.

Policemen's involvement with political individuals and parties

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15.56 conduct Rules prohibit all Government servants including the police personnel from being members of or otherwise being associated with any political party, or any organisation which takes part in politics. They are also required to endeavour to prevent any member of their family from taking similar part in politics. Canvassing or otherwise interfering with or using their influence in connection with any election is also 'prohibited—vide Rule 5 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules and Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules. However, in practice this important Conduct Rule does not appear to have been enforced with the required strictness and severity. It is well known that in the symbiotic relationship that has developed between the politicians and the executive, several police personnel have developed close contacts with politicians and are known to seek political influence and interference to secure undue advantages at different stages in their career. We find that the number of instances in which police personnel get punished for infringement of this Conduct Rule are very rare. We would recommend that: the administration should take a severe view of any infringement of the above mentioned conduct rule and deal with erring officers in a deterrent manner. In appropriate cases resort may also be had to article 311(2)(b) or (c) to weed out such personnel from the system. In cases where this constitutional provision is invoked, all the available material against the police personnel concerned should be scrutinised by a small Committee under the Chairmanship of the Chief of Police. Members of this Committee may be drawn from senior ranks in the prosecuting agency set up of the State and police officers of the rank of Deputy Inspector General of Police (other than the one who may have been concerned either directly or in a supervisory capacity with the situations or instances that figure in the material for consideration by the Committee).
Political infiltration into police15.57 We would also like to point out another danger in this context—the danger of political infiltration into the police system. It is conceivable that some political parties adopt a deliberate strategy of injecting into the police system, through channels of recruitment at different levels, young men who are strongly committed to the ideologies of the political party and could be expected to influence, from within, , the functioning of the police system to conform to these ideologies. While we do not hold any brief for or against any political party to say that the membership thereof or association therewith should not or should act as a bar for recruitment to the police at any , level, we would state emphatically that the continued involvement in political activity of any kind either directly or indirectly by any personnel after joining the police at any level should not be tolerated in) any circumstances. The weeding out of such persons should receive special attention of the Chief of Police from time to time. Here again, recourse may be had to the provisions of article 311(2)(b) or (c) of the Constitution, if need be in appropriate cases.
Transfer/Suspension of police personnel15.58 We have already referred to the threat continuously faced by police officers in the shape of frequent transfers, suspensions, etc. ordered by the government on political considerations. An analysis of suspensions ordered in a few States in 1977 has shown that in the rank of Inspectors 27% of suspensions were actually ordered by authorities higher than the authority normally competent to order their suspension. In the case of Sub-Inspectors this percentage is 16. This indicates the trend of interference from a higher level to bring about the suspension of officers when the normally competent authority to order a suspension may not consider it necessary to do so. We feel that police officers should be effectively protected from such whimsical and mala fide transfer/suspension orders. One step for securing this protection could be to incorporate a provision in the Police/Act itself specifying the authorities competent to issue transfer/suspension orders regarding different ranks. Such a statutory provision would render hull and void any transfer/suspension order passed by any authority other than those specified in the Act This would be an improvement over the present "position where the powers of transfer/suspension are merely spelt out in rules or executive instructions which can always be overruled by the government as and when it feels like doing so for reasons of its own.
15.59 Another step could be to lay down as a rule that every transfer/suspension order should also contain a brief paragraph indicating the reasons for the issue of the order, and making it a further rule that any transfer/suspension order' which does not contain this explanatory paragraph shall not be a valid order. The advantage in this arrangement would be that the recipient of the transfer/suspension order will have some material with him which he can agitate before the authorised available forums if he feels that the reasons are mala fide or otherwise not sustainable.

Amendment to Section 3 of the Police Act, 1861

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Amendment to Section 3 of the Police Act, 1861
15.54 The constitution of such a Commission will, in our opinion, help considerably in making police performance politically neutral. While retaining governmental responsibility for overseeing the police, this Commission will ensure that this responsibility is discharged in an open manner with publicly known policy directions and guidelines. The arrangements of an annual evaluation report from the same Commission and constant review of the functioning of the police by it would also further ensure that police performance in any given period has conformed to the prescribed policy directions and guidelines and has served public interests in the best possible manner. We recommend that the limits of supervisory responsibility of the State Government in regard to police performance as observed in para 15.36 to 15.38 above, and the constitution of a State Security Commission as proposed above to help the State Government in discharging this responsibility may be spelt out in a new provision in the Police Act .in replacement of the existing Section 3 of that Act
Intelligence wing of the police15.55 A sensitive area of police functions with considerable scope for misuse of police relates to collection of intelligence. Under the garb of having to collect intelligence regarding matter & which have a bearing on the law and order situation and internal security in the State, the intelligence wing of the State Police frequently collects a variety of information regarding activities of political parties and individual politicians. It is a fact that the style of functioning of certain political parties and individuals with certain political ideologies has sometimes led to disturbances to public order. Collection of intelligence regarding activities which are likely to lead to such situations becomes a necessary part of the preventive functions of the police. The assessment whether the activity of a particular party or group or individual is likely to lead to a public order situation as such, is sometimes made by the police functionaries in the intelligence wing, not on their own judgment but on directions or indications emanating from the political leadership in Government at a given point of time. When this assessment is made at the instance of the political executive, it is likely to be coloured by political considerations in preference to the actual requirement of the interests of the public or the State as such. This very often leads to misuse of the intelligence wing to collect intelligence in political matters, not strictly relatable to public order or internal security. In this context, the Shah Commission of Inquiry has referred to some aspects of the functioning of the Intelligence Bureau and the Central Bureau of Investigation at the Centre and has pointed out the need for appropriate safeguards to be evolved to ensure that these organisations are not put to misuse by the Government or some one in the Government. We would like to point out that the tendency to misuse these organisations would get accentuated by political instability in Government and, viewed from this angle, the functionaries in these organisations would need protection from improper and unhealthy pulls and pressures that might operate in such situations. We understand from the Ministry of Home Affairs that (hey have recently received the Report of the high level Committee headed by Shri L. P. Singh, a former Home Secretary and presently Governor of Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura, which was appointed in pursuance of the observations of the Shah Commission of Inquiry regarding the Intelligence Bureau and the Central Bureau of Investigation. The points (hat may emerge from the analysis of L. P. Singh Committee Report would, in our opinion, be applicable in a substantial measure to the working of intelligence wing in the State Police as also the State Anti-Corruption agencies. We recommend that Central Government may communicate to the State Governments the essential observations and recommendations emanating from the L. P. Singh committee Report for their information and further action to regard to their own agencies, not only for overseeing their performance but also for protecting than from unhealthy influences.

State Security Commission

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15.46 We have already given our views on the scope of the power of superintendence of the State Government over the police and the necessary limitations within which that power has to be exercised if the police were to function as servants of law truly and efficiently. It would not be enough to secure the desired objective if lofty principles are merely enunciated and the existing control mechanism is allowed to operate in practice without any change. There is immediate need to devise a new mechanism of control and supervision which would help the State Government to discharge this superintending responsibility in an open manner under the framework of law, with due regard to healthy norms and conventions that may develop in due course. For this purpose we recommend the constitution of a statutory Commission in each State which may be called the State Security Commission which shall have the State Minister incharge of police as the ex-officio Chairman and six others as Members. Two Members shall be chosen from the State Legislature, one from the ruling party and another from the opposition parties. They shall be appointed to this Commission on the advice of the Speaker of the State Legislature. The remaining four members of the Commission shall be appointed by the Chief Minister, subject to approval' by the State Legislature, from retired judges of the High Court, retired Government servants who had functioned in senior positions in the Government while in service, social scientists ox academicians of public standing and eminence. The Chief of Police will ex-officio function as Secretary of this Commission which shall have its own Secretariat for the transaction of its business. Arrangement of funds for the functioning of this Commission will be made on the same lines as for the State Public Service Commission.
15.47 The term of the Members of the Commission (other than the Chairman) shall be three years. any among the four non-political Members were to join a political party after being appointed to the Commission, he shall immediately cease to be a Member of the Commission and the vacancy shall be filled by fresh appointment from the non-political category.
15.48 The functions of the State Security Commission shall include—(i) laying down broad policy guidelines and directions for the performance of preventive tasks and service-oriented functions by the police ;(u) evaluation of the performance of the State Police every year and presenting a report to the State Legislature ;(iii) functioning as a forum of appeal for disposing of representations from any police officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above regarding his being subjected to illegal or irregular orders in the performance of his duties ;(iv) functioning as a forum of appeal for disposing of representations from police officers regarding promotion to the rank of Superintendent of Police and above; and(v) generally keeping in review the functioning of the police in the State.
15.49 The Commission shall devise its own procedures for transaction of business. It shall be open to the Chairman and Members of the Commission and also the Chief of Police to bring up for consideration by the Commission, any subject falling within its jurisdiction.
15.50 The Commission shall meet at least once every month and may meet more often, if required by the Chairman or Members of the Commission or the Chief of Police for considering any particular subject proposed by them.
15.51 As the Chairman of the Commission, the Minister-in-charge of police will be able. to project the government point of view during the Commission's deliberations. Any policy direction or guidelines Which the government desire to issue shall have to be agreed to by the Commission before they are passed on to the police for implementation. However in an emergency, the Government may directly issue a, policy direction or guidelines in regard to a specific situation, but such direction or guidelines shall as soon as possible be brought before the Commission fix ratification and be subject to such modifications is the Commission might decide.
15.52 In recommending the constitution of a State Security Commission as outlined above, we have taken into consideration the various suggestions received in this regard from different sections of the public as also the services in response to our questionnaire in which we had posed this suggestion and sought their reactions. Analysis of the replies received to our questionnaire shows an interesting pattern of response. A majority of respondents from the administration outside the police have favoured strengthening of the existing executive control without the intervention of a separate Commission as proposed. On the other hand a large majority of police officers have wholeheartedly welcomed the constitution of such a Commission. Leaving aside these sections of services which are intimately and directly involved in the present arrangements and, therefore, may be biased one way or the other, we find that a good majority of the other respondents from the judiciary, lawyers, businessmen, elected representatives and the general public have favoured the idea of such a Commission.
15.53 The constitution of the Security Commission as visualised above would ensure its overall nonpolitical character though it would, in its internal deliberations, have scope for taking into account political views as may be reflected by the Chairman and the two political Members. When we discussed the proposed set up of the Commission with a cross-section of the public as well as services in different States, we heard comments that in the present set up of the country it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a non-political being 1 We consider this to be a somewhat cynical and defeatist view of the matter. We are firmly of the opinion that a beginning has to be made to set up an institution like the proposed State Security Commission to ensure political neutrality in police performance. There may be reservations and doubts to begin with, but we are confident that as the system gets going, it would soon acquire maturity and effectiveness to the satisfaction of the general public.

Tenure of office for the Chief of Police

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15.43 We have already referred to the weakening of the normal chain of command resulting from unauthorised interference with police work by political and other extraneous sources. To restore the capacity of the police as an organization to resist such pressures and illegal or irregular orders, we consider it would be extremely useful if the Chief of Police in a State is assured of a statutory tenure of office, without the Damocles* sword of transfer hanging over his head all the time, subject to political whim. Such a tenure of office will strengthen his position and enable him to stand up effectively against such pressures on the system. The tenure may be fixed as a period of four years or a period extending upto the date of his retirement or promotion in the normal course, whichever is shorter. This tenure should be put on a statutory basis by being included in a specific provision in the Police Act itself. It shall also be provided that the removal of the Chief of Police from the post before the expiry of the tenure period shall require approval from the State Security Commission m proposed in paragraph 15.46 infra, except when the removal is consequent on—(i) a punishment of dismissal/removal/compulsory retirement from service or reduction to a lower post, awarded under the provisions of All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules ; or(ii) suspension ordered under the provisions of the above said Rules ; or(iii) retirement from service on superannuation in the normal course; or(iv) promotion to a higher ranking post either under the State Government or the Central Government, provided the officer had given his consent to the posting on promotion.
15.44 It shall be further provided that an officer who has functioned as Chief of Police shall, on retirement from service, be barred from re-employment under the State Government or the Central Government or in any public undertaking in which the State or the Central Government have a financial interestAppointment of Chief of Police
15.45 Any arrangement of protecting a functionary like the Chief of Police with an assured tenure of office has necessarily to be accompanied by a procedure to ensure a proper selection of the person so that the protection is not put to abuse. For this purpose we recommend that the posting of Chief of Police in a State should be from a panel of IPS officers of that State cadre prepared by a Committee of which the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission will be the Chairman and the Union Home Secretary, the senior most among the Heads of Central Police Organisations, the Chief Secretary of the State and the existing Chief of Police in the State will be Members. In the absence of the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission, the senior most Member of the Commission shall chair the Committee. The panel should not have more than three names at any time. Posting from the panel should be according to seniority : We visualise that in the future police set up at the Centre and m the States, the Chiefs of State Police and the Heads of Central Police Organisations will be of comparable status and it should be possible for the Central and State Governments to arrange for periodic inter-change of officers at this level without involving any loss of rank or status as experienced now. The association of the Central Government sad the State Government in jointly preparing this panel would ensure its acceptability to both and facilitate smooth inter-change of officers at the highest level in the normal course .

Police tasks—categorisation

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15.39 Police tasks may be broadly divided into three categories for die purpose of this analysis. They are (i) investigative; (ii) preventive and (iii) service oriented. Investigative tasks will include all action by the police in the course of investigating a ease under Chapter of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Preventive tasks will cover such actions like preventive arrests under section 151 Cr. P.C., initiation of security proceedings, arrangement of beats and patrols, collection of intelligence and maintenance of crime records to plan and execute appropriate preventive action, deployment of police force as a preventive measure when breach of peace is threatened, .handling of unlawful assemblies and their dispersal, .'' Service-oriented functions will include rendering service of a general nature during fairs and festivals, rescuing children lost in crowds, providing relief in 'distress 'situations arising from natural calamities.
Investigative tasks—Professional independence15.40 As far as investigative tasks are concerned we have a clear ruling from the Supreme Court that the nature of action to be taken on conclusion of investigation is a matter to be decided by the police only and by no other authority—vide para 18 of the Sepreme Court judgment in criminal appeal No. 218 of 1966 reported in AIR 1968 Supreme Court 117 (V 55 32). In view of (he importance of this judgment which sets out a fundamental principle, a copy thereof is furnished in Appendix-VI. It may, therefore, be safely projected as a fundamental Principle governing police work that the investigative tasks of the police are beyond any kind of intervention By the executive or non-executive. Any arrangement in which the investigative tasks of the police are sought to be brought under executive control and would go against this fundamental principle spelt out by the Supreme Court and hence should be deemed illegal. We would, therefore, recommend in the-first place that all the executive instructions issued by (he, government having a bearing on investigative tasks of the police may be scrutinised and either cancelled or modified to conform to the above principle.
15.41 during the pendency of an investigation, any person including a political functionary gets information which he feels should be passed on to thepolice for appropriate follow up action during the course of investigation itself, he should merely pass on such information to the police without in any way attempting to interfere with the investigation.
Preventive tasks and service-oriented functions-Policy control by Government15.42 In the performance of preventive tasks and service-oriented functions, the police will need to interact with other governmental agencies and service organisations. For example, in planning preventive measures in a near-strike situation in an educational institution or an industrial unit, police will have to keep in touch with the educational authorities or the labour departmental authorities to have a proper perception of the developing situation. In the performance of such preventive tasks there is considerable scope for exercise of discretion, having in view the overall public interests involved in any particular situation. every police officer should normally be left free to exercise this discretion on his own judgment but there may be situations the disposal of which may have repercussions beyond the jurisdiction of one police officer and it will become necessary in such cases for the supervisory ranks to step in and exercise discretion at their level. Extending this analogy one can visualise a State wide situation in which the exercise of discretion in regard to preventive tasks may have to take into account several factors of State wide significance and it would be appropriate in public interest that the exercise of discretion in such situations conforms to some policy approach that may be" evolved at the highest political level in the government which has the ultimate responsibility for proper governance of the State. We, therefore, recommend that in the performance of preventive tasks and service-oriented functions police should be subject to the overall guidance from the government which should lay down broad policies for adoption in different situations from time to time. There should, however, be no instructions in regard to actual operations in the field. The discretion of the police officer to deal with the situation, within the four comers of the overall guidance and broad policies, should be unfettered.' An erring officer can always be made accountable for his action. Such policy directions should be openly given and made known to the State Legislatures also as and when occasion demands. '

Shah Commission's observations

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15.35 We would commence our analysis of the problem by quoting the following observations in Chapter XXIV of the Third and Final Report dated 6th August, 1978 of the Shah Commission of Inquiry :"Para 24.10—The political system that our Constitution has given to our country is such that it contemplates parties with different political ideologies administering the affairs of the Centre and the State Governments. It is necessary in the interest of the territorial, political and economic integrity of the nation to ensure that the factors which contribute to such integrity are forever and continuously strengthened and not impaired. One such factor, and a very important and decisive one, is the body of public servants at various levels and particularly those at the decision making levels belonging to the different disciplines and functioning in the States and at ^ the Center. If the basic unity and territorial integrity of the country is to be emphasized at the political level it is imperative to ensure that the officials at the decision making levels are protected and immunised from threats or pressures so that they can function in a manner in which they are governed by one single consideration—the promotion of public well-being and the upholding of the fundamentals of the Constitution and the rule of law. The Government ought to ensure this, if necessary, by providing adequate and effective safeguards to which the officials may turn if and when necessary against any y^ actual or attempted threats by the political ^"and/or administrative authorities to sway the officials from performance of their legitimate duties.Para 24.17.................. a recurrence of tins type of subversion is to be prevented, the system must be overhauled with a view to strengthen it in a manner that the functionaries working the system do so in an atmosphere free from the fear of the consequences of their lawful actions and in a spirit calculated to promote the integrity and welfare of the Nation and the rule of law.
This will call for considerable bean-searching both .at the political and the administrative levels. Both the groups, during the period of the emergency, sadly deviated from their respective legitimate roles of duty, trespassing into each other's areas with the consequences that are there for all to see and many to lament. the officials on the one side and the politicians on the other do not limit their areas of operation to their accepted and acknowledged fields, this Nation cannot be kept safe for working a democratic system at Government. . ."Our principal task in this exercise will, therefore, be to spell out as precisely as possible the areas in which political functionaries including the political executive may have legitimate facility for interaction/intercession sad intervention with the career executive which will naturally include the police, and to further spell out the appropriate safeguards to ensure that this (acuity does not lead to unauthorised interference with the executive.
Government's superintendence over police15.36 The phenomenon of 'interference' with Police is, in popular estimate and belief, linked with the existing system of control 'over (he police by the political executive in Government. It has been argued before us by functionaries in the political executive in some States that tile Minister in charge of police has to account for and defend police performance in the Stale Legislature and in order to fulfil this responsibility properly he must have full control over the police. According to thorn the police cannot be conceived as an agency independent of Government control. Everyone will readily agree that while attempting to insulate the police from unauthorized interference from political and other extraneous sources, we should not confer a totally independent status on the police which would then make A function as a "State within a State* Our object, however, is to devise a system in which police will have professional and operational independence, particularly in matters in which their duties and responsibilities are categorically specified in law with little or no room for discretion and at the same time their overall performance can be effectively monitored and kept within the framework of law by an agency which will involve the Government also. In the existing set up the Government seeks to have fun control over the police by virtue of Section 3 of the Police Act, 1861 according to which "Superintendence of the police throughout a general police district shall vest m and shall be exercised by the State Government to which such district is subordinate". While evolving ideas regarding the nature of relationship between the Government and the police that would be desirable ib public interest in a democracy, we have examined the scope of supervision and control that can be deemed to flow from the word 'superintendence* occurring in the above section of law. to this context we have seen some rulings of the Supreme Court relating to article 227 of the Constitution according to which "Every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts subject to its appellate tribunal acting without jurisdiction". The purport of some relevant observations of the Supreme Court is furnished below :—(i) The general superintendence which the High Court has over all courts and tribunals is a duty to keep them within bounds of the authority and to sec that they do what then duty requires and they do it in a legal manner. It does not involve responsibility for the correctness of the decisions of the subordinate tribunals either in fact or in law—AIR 1971 (SC) 315.(ii) An error of fact or law resulting in a tribunal exercising jurisdiction not vested in it by law or in having failed to exercise jurisdiction vested m it by law, both come within the scope of superintendence of the High Court. Apart from matters relating to jurisdiction, flagrant abuse of elementary principles of justice, manifest error patent on face of record, or an outrageous miscarriage of justice, all call for exercise of powers by way of superintendence—1971 CRLJ 134—1971 116.iii) The power should be restricted to interference in case of grave dereliction of duty for which no other remedy is available and which would have serious consequences if not remedied. The High Court cannot under the 'superintendence' powers go into the merits of the dispute before the inferior court or tribunal in the absence of grounds such as, one of jurisdiction, grave irregularity of procedure, resulting in prejudice to the detriment to one of the parties and so on—AIR 1953 (SC)—58-59.(iv) Ordinarily there should be no interference by the High Courts with the decisions of the ulterior courts or tribunals m matters which are left by law to the discretion of the inferior tribunal or court—AIR 1972 HP 24.
15.37 From these observations ft may be seen that the power of superintendence by the High Court is generally exercisable m the following category of cases :— .(i) Lower court or jurisdiction.(ii) Lower court or tribunal refusing or failing to exercise jurisdiction or to do its duty.(iii) Conflict of jurisdiction (interference only when there is no other remedy).(iv) Refusal or failure to proceed with a case.(v) Proceeding contrary to principles of natural justice.(vi) Personal interest of Judge in the issue to be decided.(vii) Illegal orders of the court. (viii) Patently erroneous decision on facts.
15.38 Having regard to the general principles enunciated above in regard to judiciary, we feel that it 'would be appropriate to lay down that the power of the State Government over the ; be limited for the purpose of ensuring that police performance is in strict accordance with law.

Political instability and politicisation of police

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15.25 The phenomenon of political interference appears to have assumed larger dimensions particularly after 1967 when the continued stability of the elected Governments in some States got disturbed and a period of political instability started. Increased political interference in such a context meant the increased division of the police personnel into different cliques and groups with different political leanings. A police force which does not remain outside politics but is constantly subjected to influences and pressures emanating within the system from the politicised police personnel themselves will in turn seriously disturb the stability of the duly elected political leadership in the State itself and thereby cause serious damage to the fabric of our democracy. This danger has to be realised with equal seriousness and concern by the politician as well as by the police.
15.26 The increasing scope for mala fide interaction between the politician and the police has also encouraged unscrupulous policemen at different levels to forge a working relationship with the politician for gaining Undue career advantage, besides pecuniary advantage resulting from collusive corruption. The phenomenon of political interference has thus grown to enormous proportion, assiduously fed by vested interests among the police as well as the politicians. We are conscious that any remedial measures we might think of in this context will have to contend with resistance from such vested interests on both sides.
Experience in other democracies15.27 On a survey of the existing situation as outlined in the foregoing paragraphs; any observer of the national scene is bound to feel extremely pessimistic and throw up his hands in despair. He may, however, draw some consolation from world history which indicates that perhaps this is an inevitable and passing phase in the growth of any young democracy.
15.28 An interesting study of the evolution of police reform in the United States of America by Robert M. Fogelson, Professor of Urban Studies and History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Consultant for the President's Crime Commission, shows a remarkable similarity to some of the problems we are currently experiencing in the Indian police situation. The following extracts from Fogelson's study report, which depict the situation on the American scene around 1900, are relevant in this connection."Whoever dominated the police could assign to the polls hundreds of tough, well-armed, if not necessarily well-disciplined men, whose jobs. the politicians reminded them, depended on the outcome. Empowered to maintain order in the streets, the police decided whether or not to permit agitators to speak, protestors to march, and laborers to picket, and if so, judged whether or not the protests remained orderly. They also determined whether or not to intervene in racial, ethnic, and religious clashes, and if so, at what point, on whose side, with how many men, and with how much force. Whoever controlled the police possessed an enviable flexibility to respond to confrontations and crises in ways consistent with their own political objectives, which was a tremendous advantage in a society so prone to group conflict.The captain's wardman, a patrolman who collected the payoffs in the precinct, had more influence than many sergeants and roundsmen; and so did veteran patrolmen who were well regarded by local politicians. As every recruit who survived for long learned, most officers derived their prerogatives and influence as much from then" political connections as from then official positions. Formal organization also corresponded poorly, if at all, with actual operation. The chiefs could not possibly know what went on outside headquarters; and their assistants, who owed their positions to the political organizations, would . rarely tell them. The captains, who got their jobs through the ward bosses, felt no compunction about ignoring departmental instructions inconsistent with the injunctions of the local machines.But as the investigative committees discovered, the police manuals were deceptive. Most politicians, including the Democrats who paid lip service to the concept of an apolitical police and the Republicans who criticized their opponents for interfering with the department, viewed control of the force as a prerogative of the party in power.To secure an appointment, most candidates went not to the police commissioners or the police chiefs but straight to the New York district leaders, the Philadelphia ward leaders, the Chicago aldermen, and other influential politicians. Some politicians demanded a payoff: in the 1890s the going rate for a patrolman was 4:300 in New York City and $400 in San Francisco, according to investigating committees. But most politicians preferred evidence that the candidate and his friends or relatives had been helpful to the party in the past and could be counted on by the organization in the future.As most patrolmen soon learned, the sympathetic concern of an influential politician was far better protection than the procedural safeguards of a departmental hearing."
15.29 Even the phenomenon of transfers at the dictates of political bosses was a noticeable feature in the American Police system. Fogelson's study report refers to an intransigent New York City officer who told a State Investigating Committee, "I have been transferred so continuously that I keep my goods packed ready to go at a minute's notice".
15.30 The direction of subsequent police reforms in the United States was towards strengthening the position of the police chief by giving him a reasonable tenure of office and reducing the scope for political interference. Policing was developed as a profession with emphasis on high admission standards, extensive training, and acquisition of a wide range of special skills. Policemen were made to subscribe to a Code of Ethics devoting themselves to the public interest.
15.31 In the United Kingdom the need to prevent political patronage from .affecting the performance of civil services was recognised by the creation of the Civil Services Commission in 1855 which established independent civil services recruited through open competition. It, however, took 'nearly 15 years for the political parties to relinquish the patrontage they had till then enjoyed and agree to the new arrangement. The experience of several other democracies has also shown the need for evolving healthy norms in the interaction between the political leadership in Government and the executive services, to ensure that each section performs its duly recognised role and benefits by the corrective influence from the other in constantly serving the cause of public interest.
15.32 We have already observed how in the early years after independence the political leadership provided by well-motivated administrators and statesmen had in fact enabled the services including the police to function effectively in the best interests of the public at large. We feel confident that the existing situation can certainly be corrected and we can evolve practicable remedial measures to bring about a healthy functioning of the police with helpful and wise guidance from the elected representatives of the people.Remedial measures
15.33 Before we proceed to set out some possible remedial measures we would like to clarify at this stage the ambit of the meaning of certain terms we will be frequently using in our Report while dealing with this subject.
Some definitions15.34 The term "politician" will denote any person who indulges in political activity of any kind, directly or indirectly, either as a formal member of a political party or otherwise. Political functionaries in government, like Ministers and Deputy Ministers will be referred to by the term "political executive". The mere term "executive" without the suffix 'political' will be used to" refer to the normal career executives in government. The meanings of the words 'intercede', 'intervene* and 'interfere' require to be well understood to appreciate the points that will be made in the paragraphs to follow. A may be said to intercede in a situation with if he merely pleads with on behalf of another person to make better understand the representation of the other person. A may be deemed to have intervened m a situation with if by such intercession he seeks to modify the disposal of a matter by without in any way bringing any kind of pressure on B. Lastly, A may be said to interfere with in the discharge of the latter's functions if A directs -f or experts pressure directly or indirectly on to act or omit to act in a manner otherwise than on B's own judgment and assessment of the relevant facts. However, it shall not amount to 'interference' if A has the direct supervisory responsibility over and has the concurrent power to act as aforesaid under the law or rules or duly recognised procedure and takes direct responsibility for the orders.

Police during Emergency of 1975—77

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15.24 The brazen manner in which the police were misused during the emergency of 1975—77 to subvert lawful procedures and serve purely political ends is brought out in Chapter XV of the Interim Report II dated 26th April, 1978, given by the Shah Commission of Inquiry, which is reproduced below :"15.16 The Commission invites the Government's attention pointedly to the manner in which the Police was used and allowed themselves to be used for purposes some of which were, to say the least, questionable. Some Police officers behaved as though they are not accountable at all to any public authority. The decision to arrest and release certain persons were" entirely on political considerations which were intended to be favourable to the ruling party. Employing the police to the advantage of any political party is a sure source of subverting the rule of law. The Government must seriously consider the feasibility and the desirability of insulating the police from the politics of the country and employing it scrupulously on dudes for which alone it is by law intended. The policemen must also be made to realise that politicking by them is outside the sphere of their domain and the Government would take a very serious view of it.15.17 In this context the Commission can do no better than quote from one of the speeches of Sir Robert Mark, the ex-Chief Commissioner of Police, London. Its relevance for 'the Police of our country is self evident. Sir Robert Mark says :—'Our authority under the law is strictly defined and we are personally liable for the consequences whenever we invoke it. We play no part in determining guilt or punishment and our accountability to the courts, both criminal and civil, to local police authorities, to Parliament and to public opinion is unsurpassed anywhere else in the world. In the legal and constitutional framework in which society requires us to enforce the laws enacted by its elected representatives, the most essential weapons in our armoury are not firearms, water cannon, tear gas or rubber bullets, but the confidence and support of the people on whose behalf we act. That confidence and support depends Hot only on the factors I have already mentioned but on our personaland collective integrity and in particular on our long tradition of constitutional freedom from political interference in our operational role. .Notwithstanding me heavy responsibilities for the policing of England and Wales given to the Home Secretary by the 1964 Police Act, it is important for you to understand that the police are not the servants of the Government at any level. We do not act at the behest of a minister or any political party, not even the party in government. We act on behalf of the people as a whole and the powers we exercise cannot be restricted or widened by anyone, save Parliament alone. -^ It is this which above all else determines our relationship with the public, especially in relation to the maintenance of public , order, and allows us to operate reasonably effectively, with minimal numbers, limited powers and by the avoidance of force, or at least with the use only of such force as will be approved by the courts and by public opinion.''To sum the position up for you in easily understandable and practical terms, a chief officer of police will always give the most careful consideration to any views or representations he may receive from his police authority, be it Home Secretary or police committee, on any issue affecting enforcement of the law, whether public order or anything else, but in England and Wales it is generally for him and him alone to decide what operational action to take and to answer for the consequences. In the case of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis his exercise of those responsibilities will no doubt be all the more scrupulous in that he alone of all chief police officers enjoys no security of tenure and that subject to parliamentary approval he may be removed by the Home Secretary.'I emphasise this because while the police place great importance on their constitutional freedom the significance of their accountability should not be overlooked as a counter-balance to any improper use of it'.15.18 The Commission feels that what applies to the police applies in equal measure to the Services as a whole. The politician who uses a public servant for purely political purposes and the public servant who allows himself to be so used are both debasing themselves and doing a signal disservice to the country."

Issue of illegal/irregular orders by State Governments

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Issue of illegal/irregular orders by State Governments
15.20 In their anxiety to ensure police performance in accordance with the appreciation of the situation by the political party in power, some State Governments are known to have issued executive instructions restricting the scope for police action even in situations where a specific line of action by police is, enjoined on them by law itself. We have a typical instance in West Bengal in what has come to be known as the "Jay Engineering Works Case". This case arose from the executive instructions issued by the Government of West Bengal on 27th March, 1967, laying it down that in cases of "gherao" of industrial establishments by ' their workers resulting in the confinement of managerial and other staff, the matter should be referred to the Labour Minister and his directions obtained before deciding upon police intervention for the rescue of the confined personnel. When an affected party obtained an injunction from Calcutta High Court against the implementation of this order, a further order was issued by the State Government on 12th June, 1967, stating that "the police must not intervene in legitimate labour movements and that, in case of any complaint regarding unlawful activities in connection with such movements, the police must first investigate carefully whether the complaint has any basis in fact before proceeding to take any action provided under the law". Executive instructions conveyed in both these circulars were later struck down by Calcutta High Court as contrary to law, without jurisdiction and invalid. In view of the importance of the legal position clearly set out in this judgment, a copy of extracts from AIR 1968 Calcutta 407 (V 55 84) which give the ruling of the Court on the specific issues raised in this case along with copies of the three circulars dated 7th February, 1956, 27th March, 1967 and 12th June. 1967 of the Government of West Bengal, is enclosed as Appendix V.
15.21 We have seen another instance in another State (U.P.) where the following executive instructions were issued in March 1977, governing police action in law and order situations :"Whenever a situation likely to have a bearing on the general law and order situation arises in the district, the Superintendent of Police will immediately inform the District Magistrate by the quickest means available and seek his instructions in regard to the steps to be taken to meet the situation, unless circumstances make it impracticable to do so. Further action to meet the situation will be taken according to the instructions of and in close and continuous consultation with and guidance from the District Magistrate."[U.P. Government Order No. 7850/VUI-1-51-A/ 76 dated 21st March 1977]This insistence on prior consultation with the executive functionary who has direct contact with Government before taking action to deal with a law and order situation would definitely inhibit the police from taking even such steps as are enjoined on them directly by law in a given situation. To that extent we feel that these executive instructions must be deemed to be illegal.
15.22 We are also aware that in several States executive instructions have been issued conferring a kind of supervisory and inspecting role on the subordinate executive magistrates vis-a-vis the police. Section 3 of the Police Act, 1861, runs as under :—"3. SUPERINTENDENCE IN THE STATE GOVERNMENT—The superintendence of the police throughout a general police district shall vest in and be exercised by the State Government to which such district is subordinate, and except as authorised under the provisions of this Act, no person, officer or court shall be empowered by the State Government to supersede or control any police functionary."The Act itself does not confer any supervisory or inspecting role on the subordinate ranks of executive magistrates in a district and, therefore, any executive instructions issued by the Government empowering them to control the police in any manner should be deemed to be illegal.
15.23 We have referred to the above-mentioned instances to underline the fact that in the garb of executive instructions that flow from the Government from time to time. attempts have been made to subordinate police personnel to executive requirements, without regard to the requirements of law as such. Interference with police by political, executive or other extraneous sources have to be seen as a part of this philosophy and therefore, require to be analysed from the point of view of propriety or impropriety of such an approach.

State Police Commissions

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State Police Commissions
15.8 We notice that several State Police Commissions have also referred to this malady. The Punjab Police Commission (1961-62) said : "The evidence led before the Commission has disclosed that members of political parties, particularly of the ruling party, whether in the Legislature or outside, interfere considerably in the working of the police for unlawful ends. We have been told that politicians accompany complainants to police stations and try to influence the Station House Officer to take down reports implicating innocent persons against whom the complainant has enmity .... no objection can be taken to politicians accompanying their constituents for lawful purposes but the objection is that they approach the Station House Officer for ulterior purposes and use their position to influence him. He is threatened that if he does not support them, they will bring orders from above for his transfer, or will otherwise harm him in his career. . . .the result of this political interference is disastrous and it has considerably and very seriously affected the police work in the State. The police are demoralised". The Kerala Police Reorganisation Committee (1959) said : "The greatest obstacle to efficient police administration flows from the domination of party politics under the State administration. Pressure is applied in varying degrees and so often affects different branches of administration. The result of partisan interference is often reflected in lawless enforcement of laws, inferior service and in general decline of police prestige followed by irresponsible criticism end consequent widening of the cleavage between the police and the public affecting the confidence of the public in the integrity and objectives of the police force". The Tamil Nadu Police Commission (1971) stated : "The problem of political interference is not a new one. It cannot be dated 'from February 1967. It has grown over the years, during the term of office of a number of different Ministers. And it has grown in spite of the most explicit public declarations made by successive Chief Ministers (including the present one) that there should be no political interference and they expect officers to do their duty without fear or favour, in the confident expectation of government support. .... The problem is by no means peculiar to Tamil Nadu. The position in this State is no worse than in the best among other States and much better than in many". The West Bengal Police Commission (1960-61) found that there were frequent allegations that investigation of offences is sometimes sought to be interfered with by influential persons highly placed in society or office. .... and concluded : "We have little doubt that such interference takes place, although it is difficult to say to what extent they are prevalent".The Committee on Police Training set up by the Government of India (1972) reported : "There have been instances where Governments have been accused of using the police machinery for political ends. There are also instances of individual politicians interfering with the administration and the work of the police". The Committee had found a great deal of political interference in the administration as well as the operation of the police forces, particularly at the lower level. The Delhi Police Commission (1968) observed : "We have been informed that political interference is another rich source of corruption. Allegations have been made before us that some politicians resort to the device of securing the assistance of goondas and bad characters who are given protection by the police. This protection is the result of influence exercised by the politicians upon policemen. We are not in a position to say to what extent this allegation is true, and if there is a large substance of truth in it. but the evil undoubtedly exists. . . . and the only way to do away with it is to take a strong stand against political interference. This can come only from within the police force and the higher officers of the department should make it a code of their conduct to resist all kinds of unlawful interference and to see that their subordinates also do not permit themselves to be influenced by this kind of pressure".
Study by I.I.P.O.15.9 The extent of political interference with police as perceived by the public is also revealed in a study conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion, New Delhi at the instance of the Ministry of Home Affairs in September—December. 1978 regarding "Image of the Police in India". The study covered interviews with a total of 4,000 respondents, made up of a random sample of 1,000 each from the districts of Ballia (Uttar Pradesh), Ramanathapuram (Tamil Nadu) and Ranchi (Bihar), besides Delhi. The questionnaire for the study" had three types of questions. One type was the unaided question where the respondent was free to indicate his own reply, without being restricted to alternatives posed by the questioner. The second was the 'aided' question in which the respondent had to indicate his choice among the specific alternatives proposed before him. The third was the 'priority' type where the responder had to indicate the relative priority of his preferences. Respondents were divided into two broad categories :—(i) Complainants, i.e., those who had had direct interaction with the police; and(ii) Non-complainants, i.e., those who did not have such interaction.
15.10 In answer to a question (unaided) regarding causes of misuse of power and disregard of law by the police, 33% in the complainant category identified the cause as "political pressures, interference by influential people". This item jointly shared top rating with another item "motivated by money and lack of morality" which was also identified by another 33% of the complainant category. All the other causes were rated lower. In the non-complainant category, "corruption" got the top-rating at 38%,"political interference" was second with 31% and other causes fell well behind. In the complainant category, political pressure is more acutely perceived in rural areas (35%) as compared to urban areas (31%). The same position obtains in the non-complainant category also with 39% in rural areas and 22% in urban areas.
15.11 When the same question was repeated with a set of 14 alternative causes to elicit a well thought out answer, political interference took the first place, being mentioned by the highest number of respondents (81%), in the complainants category as well as non-complainant category. When the question was again repeated requesting the respondents to give priority ratings for the different causes, political interference was given the first priority by the largest number of respondents in the complainant category as well as non-complainant category, with all the other factors taking a lower priority.
15.12 The statistical tables of this study support the following conclusions :—(i) Political interference is seen by the public as a major factor contributing to the poor image of the police and manifests itself in the misuse and abuse of police powers and disregard of the law by the police;(ii) People consider political interference with police as a greater evil than even corruption; and(iii) Political interference appears more pronounced in rural areas than in urban areas.Examples
15.13 Some typical situations or matters in which pressure is brought to bear on the police by political, executive or other extraneous sources are listed below :' (i) Arrest or non-arrest of a person against whom a case is taken up for investigation by the police.(ii) Deliberate handcuffing of a person in police custody merely to humiliate him.(iii) Release or non-release on bail after arrest.(iv) Suppression of material evidence that becomes available during searches by police.(v) Inclusion or non-inclusion in the chargesheet placed in court on conclusion of investigation..(vi) Posting or non-posting of police force in an area of apprehended trouble to create an effect to the advantage of one party or the other.(vii) Taking persons into preventive custody to immobilise them from legitimate political activity in opposition to the party in power.(viii) Foisting false criminal cases against political functionaries for achieving political ends.(ix) Discretionary enforcement of law while dealing with public order situations, with emphasis on severity and ruthlessness in regard to persons opposed to the ruling party.(x) Manoeuvring police intervention by exaggerating a non-cognizable offence or engineering a false complaint to gain advantage over another party in a situation which will lie outside the domain of police action in the normal course.(xi) Preparation of malicious and tendentious intelligence reports to facilitate action against an opponent.
Transfer or suspension weapon15.14 Pressure on the police takes a variety of forms, ranging from a promise of career advancement and preferential treatment in service matters if the demand is yielded to, and a threat of drastic penal action and disfavored treatment in service matters if the pressure is resisted. While it is not possible to punish a police officer with a statutory punishment under the Discipline and Appeal Rules, without adequate grounds and following a prescribed procedure, it is very easy to subject him to administrative action by way of transfer or suspension on the basis of an alleged complaint taken up for inquiry. While suspension acts as a great humiliating factor, a transfer acts as a severe economic blow and disruption of the police officer's family, children's education, etc. The threat of transfer/suspension is the most potent weapon in the hands of the politician to bend down the police to his will. We have been told in several States about the frequent transfer of police personnel ordered on direct instructions from political levels in Government, in disregard of the rule that the transfer of the personnel concerned fell within the normal domain of the supervisory ranks within the police. We are aware of an instance in which the Inspector General of Police himself was transferred to an inconsequential post under the State Government immediately after he had shown his reluctance to issue orders for the transfer of a large number of police personnel as desired by the political leadership when he felt that the transfers were not justified on normal administrative grounds. A typical instance was brought to our notice in which even though the local commanding officer specifically pointed out the hardship and loss of morale that would result from the peremptory transfer ordered by a Minister, he was over-ruled and was asked to comply with the order forthwith. We were also informed of an instance in which an Inspector of Police, under orders of transfer issued by his departmental superiors, exclaimed publicly that he would soon get orders from above cancelling his own transfer order and transferring away his superior officer instead. The Inspector's transfer was in fact cancelled within the next few days and it was his superior officer who had to move out under the compulsion of a politically directed transfer order! The consequent serious damage to discipline and morale of the chain of command within the police system can be easily imagined.
15.15 We had commissioned the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) to make a sample survey of the living and working condition» of the constabulary in Delhi and Uttar Pradesh. Their study has inter alia revealed that about 53% and 43% of constables in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi respectively were transferred from one District to another or from one place to another in less than a year and they had mentioned it as a sore point of grievance. In their view the transfers were too frequent, ad hoc and arbitrary in nature, and were mostly ordered as a means of punishment and harassment, sometimes due to the influence of local politicians. During our tours in the States several officers brought to our notice this phenomenon of frequent and indiscriminate transfers ordered on political considerations. In one State, a Sub-Inspector broke down while narrating his story of 96 transfers in 28 years of his service! We analysed the frequency of transfers in different ranks in the States in the five year period 1973—1977 and found the following position in many States :RankAverage period of stay in the same post/ same stationI.G. 1 year & 8 months (In one State 6 IGs were changed, in this . States5 IGs were changed in this period).S.P. 1 year & 7 months (In one State it is as low as 11 months). Sub-Inspector 1 year & 2 months (In one State it is as low as 7 months and . . in three others it was 10 months)In computing the above period, we have excluded the transfers arising from normal administrative reasons like promotion to a higher post, deputation to training or to a post under the Central Government, retirement, removal/dismissal from service, etc. The frequent changes of officers, particularly at the operational level of Sub-Inspectors in Police Stations and Superintendents of Police in districts coupled with frequent changes at the apex, namely. Inspector General of Police, have no doubt largely contributed to the sharp decline in the quality of police service down the line. Inspectors General in some States have been changed as often as the Chief Minister or Home Minister changed! The interests of real professional service to the public have been sacrificed at the altar of political expediency.
Sources of pressure15.16 Political interference emanates not only from political functionaries in Government but also from others outside the Government who arc connected in any manner with different political parties including the ruling party. Further, an individual's capacity to generate political pressure on the police is not necessarily linked with his formal association with a political party. He can operate through several link» that are forged by considerations of money, caste, community, regional affinity, etc.
15.17 We are also aware that the unhealthy influences and pressures that arc brought to bear on the police do not always originate from political sources alone. Capitalists, industrialists, businessmen, landlords and such others who form the richer and more influential sections of society have immense capacity to generate such pressures to operate at different levels in the police, either directly or indirectly through political sources, and influence the course of police action. Any corrective measure to deal with this malady has, therefore, to cover this pressure group also.
Repercussions of interference15.18 Interference with the police system extraneous sources, especially the politic encourages the police personnel to believe that < career advancement does not at all depend on the merits of their professional performance, but can be secured by currying favour with politicians who count Politicking and hobnobbing with functionaries outside the police system appear very worthwhile in the estimate of an average police officer. Deliberate and sustained cultivation of a few individuals on the political plane takes up all the time of a number of police personnel to the detriment of the performance of their normal professional jobs to the satisfaction of the general public at large. This process sets the system on the downward slope to decay and total ineffectiveness.
15.19 Apart from deterioration in the quality of police performance viewed from the public point of view, the exercise of such pressure on the police system from political and other extraneous sources immediately damages the control system and weakens the normal chain of command that has to operate efficiently if the discipline and health of the system are to be maintained. Interference at the operational level in police stations, police circles, etc. results in the total by-passing of the supervisory officers in the hierarchy. Subordinate officers see it in every day of their official life that their superior officers count little in the ultimate disposal of a matter which lies in the normal course within their official cognisance only. Decisions taken at a far higher level—political levels to government—are implemented without question at the operational level. The frequent by-passing of the normal chain of command results in the atrophy of the supervisory structure. It, therefore, fails to operate effectively even in matters which do not attract any such extraneous interference. This was strikingly seen in the situation arising from the policemen's stir in certain States in May-June 1979. It is also significant that the policemen's protest activity in this period, which mostly centred round the living and working conditions of the constabulary, is reported to have been triggered off by an alleged incident in one State in which a police constable was attempted to be victimised at the behest of a political functionary. The seriousness of the situation was recognised by the conference of Chief Ministers of States convened by the Union Home Minister on the 6th June, 1979, to discuss Police Reforms, with particular reference to the First Report we had submitted to Government in February 1979. In the note circulated by the Ministry of Home Affairs for this Conference, it was noted that "there is a feeling in all States that interference not only in the matter of postings and transfers, but also in the matter of arrests, investigations and filling of charge-sheets in widespread. The principal grievance of the policemen is that if there is any unwillingness to comply with unlawful or improper suggestions, the persons concerned are harassed or humiliated". The note went on to observe farther that "Government of India would like to impress upon the Chief Ministers that efforts should be made to ensure that there is no unlawful interference in the exercise of statutory powers. Secondly, in the matter of postings and transfers States should see to restore leadership and effectiveness of the official hierarchy with a view to ensure that the requisite rapport between the officers ;and the men is not further eroded". At the end of the deliberations of this conference the participants agreed that the "problems arising out of interference will bear effective solutions at the political level". The suggestion was noted that Chief Ministers might discuss with leaders of political parties the basis for some consensus on the issue. It was also agreed that a "similar effort at the national level would also be explored and the Home Minister will request the Prime Minister to initiate appropriate steps in this behalf'.

MISUSE OF POLICE

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INTERFERENCE WITH AND MISUSE OF POLICE BY ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ORDERS OR PRESSURE FROM POLITICAL, EXECUTIVE OR OTHER EXTRANEOUS SOURCES—REMEDIAL MEASURES
Introduction15.1 '"Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially. At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance. It is fitting that at this solemn moment we take the pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people and to the still larger cause of humanity........ We end today a period of illfortune and India discovers herself" 'again. The achievement we celebrate today is but a step, an opening of opportunity, to the greater triumphs and achievements that await us. Are we brave enough and wise enough to grasp this opportunity and accept the challenge of the future ? . . . Freedom and power bring responsibility. That responsibility rests upon this Assembly, a sovereign body representing the sovereign people of India. . . . The service of India means the service of millions who suffer. It means the ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity. The ambition of the greatest man of our generation has been to wipe every tear from every eye. That may be beyond us, but as long as there are tears and suffering, so long our work will not be over. And so we have to labour and to work hard, to give reality to our dreams. . ."—thus spoke Jawahar Lal Nehru, our first Prime Minister, when he addressed the Constituent Assembly in New Delhi on the eve of Independence on 14th August, 1947. On the conclusion of this Assembly's deliberation, we adopted, enacted and gave to ourselves the Constitution of India embodying all the fundamental concepts and principles of a socialist, secular democracy.
15.2 Looking back over the years that have rolled by since then, one is apt to question and doubt whether we have progressed well on the path of democracy and evolved smooth and successful working arrangements for the purposeful functioning of the three important wings of the democratic system : Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary. The Executive has two layers—the top layer constituted by the elected political leadership in Government and the lower layer covering the career executive, namely, the civil services. While steering the country towards the promised objectives of the socialist welfare State for its hundreds of millions of people, the Government have had to control and regulate in an increasing degreethe conduct and business of different sections of people through progressive legislation and other related measures. This has meant increasing exercise of power by the Government through its widely spread apparatus of the executive in several matters affecting the daily life of the people. National leaders, who were at the helm in different parts of the country in the first decade after Independence, conducted the affairs of the Government with great vision and wise statesmanship and set down patterns of conduct and inter-relationship between the political leadership in Government on the one side and the civil services on, the other. Though not precisely defined, their respective roles were mutually understood fairly well and followed in practice. While the civil services had the benefit of lead and guidance in policy from the political leadership having in view the expectations and aspirations of the public, the political masters had the benefit of professional advice from the civil services regarding the different dimensions of the problems they had to solve. Great leaders and statesmen like Jawahar Lal Nehru, Sardar Patel, Abul' Kalam Azad, Rajagopalachari, Govind Ballabh Pant, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, K. Kamaraj, Roy and Sri Krishna Sinha provided an atmosphere of dignity and sense of direction for the civil services to function honestly and efficiently, with public interests constantly held in view. Passing years saw the entry of a large variety of people into the field of politics and increasing contact between politicians and the executive at various levels in a variety of situations, including those caused by decreasing majorities in legislatures. Scope for exercise of power through the political leadership in Government induced political functionaries outside the Government to take undue interest in the conduct of Government affairs, and gradually the spectre of 'political interference' appeared on the scene. Police, as a part of the civil services, came within the ambit of this interference. In fact the police became specially vulnerable to interference from politicians because of the immense political advantage that could be readily reaped by misuse of police powers. The quality of police performance was and continues to be adversely affected by such interference. During our tours in several States and discussions with different sections of the public as well as services, we heard repeated references to the partisan performance of police owing to frequent interference and pressures from political, executive or other extraneous sources. We propose to deal with this malady in this chapter. '
Pre-Independence Police15.3 Prior to Independence police functioned de jure and de facto as an agency totally subordinate to the executive and ever ready to carry out its commands ruthlessly, even though they may not always have been in genuine 'public interest' as viewed by the public. Though the concept of "rule of law" was introduced by the British regime, law enforcement was subject to the ultimate objective of protecting the British Crown and sustaining the British rule. hi a criminal justice system in which the executive and judicial functions were combined in the same functionaries who constituted the magistracy, accountability to law was covertly subordinated to the executive will. Military strands of the organisation, with their emphasis on discipline and unquestioning obedience, made it easy for the Government to use or misuse the police as they wished.
Post-Independence Police15.4 After long years of tradition of law enforcement subject to executive will under the British rule, the police entered their new role in independent India in 1947. The foreign power was replaced by a political party that came up through the democratic process as laid down in our Constitution. For a time things went well without any notice of any change, because of the corrective influences that were brought to bear on the administrative structure by the enlightened political leadership. However, as years passed by there was a qualitative change in the style of politics. The fervour of the freedom struggle and the concept of sacrifice that it implied faded out quickly, yielding place to new styles and norms of behaviour by politicians to whom politics became a career by itself. Prolonged one-party rule at the Centre and in the States for over 30 years coupled with the natural desire of ruling partymen to remain in positions of power resulted in the development of symbiotic relationship between politicians on one hand and the civil services on the other. Vested interests grew on both sides. What started as a normal interaction between the politicians and the services for the» avowed objective of better administration with better awareness of public feelings sad expectations, soon degenerated into different forms of intercession, intervention and interference with mala fide objectives unconnected with public interest.
15.5 The interaction of the political party in power with the civil services in general and the police in particular has also been considerably influenced by the tactics adopted by some political parties in opposition who believe in establishing their political presence only by continuously keeping up an agitationist posture. The manner in which different political parties have functioned, particularly on the eve of periodic elections, involve the free use of musclemen and Dadas to influence the attitude and conduct of sizeable sections of the electorate. Commenting on the last panchayat elections in Bihar the local correspondent of the "Hindu" reported as below in its issue of August 5, 1978 :—"The Panchayat elections like the other elections in the recent past have demonstrated once again that there can be no sanity in Bihar as long as politics continue to be based on caste and gangsterism. A significant pointer to this was the frank confession in the Assembly the other day by the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Kapildeo Singh that he patronized and would continue to patronize gangsters and criminals to fight and win elections as long as the existing system of fighting is not changed. Speaking in the Assembly, Shri Singh declared : 'It is well known that each one of us, irrespective of all party affiliations, who is serious about fighting elections, patronizes anti-social elements and enlists their support. It is another matter that we do not admit this.'"The involvement of each people in political activity brings in its wake anti-social elements who exploit then proximity to politicians to gain protection from possible police action under the law. The nexus between unscrupulous elements among politicians and such anti-social element» particularly affect the enforcement of social and economic enactments such as those against prostitution, gambling, smuggling, black-marketing, hoarding, adulteration, prohibition etc. whenever they involve politically influential accused. Arrest and enlargement on bail of persons involved in such offences and their subsequent prosecution in court attract political attention. This also results in some places in a kind of link being established between the elected representatives and the Station House Officer in the day to day affairs of the police station in which the local Dadas frequently get involved. This link facilitates the practice of corruption and other malpractices by the police and politician acting in collusion with each other.
15.6 Consequent on the agitationist posture taken up by some political parties in opposition, protest demonstrations, public meetings, procession», politically motivated strikes in the industrial sector, dharnas, gheraos, etc. have become a recurrent feature of political activity in the country. Police have been increasingly drawn into the resultant law and order situations and arc expected by the ruling party to deal with all such situations with a political eye. Putting down political dissent has become a tacitly accepted objective of the police system.
15.7 The relationship that existed between the police and the foreign power before independence was allowed to continue with the only change that the foreign power was substituted by the political party in power;The basic law—Police Act of 1861—remained practically unaltered and no attempts were made to redefine .the relationship between the police and the politically oriented Government. More and more time of the police was taken up with law and order work which really meant dealing with street situations in a manner that would cause maximum satisfaction to the ruling party. In the process, individual crimes affecting the interests of individual citizens by way of loss of their property or threat to their physical security got progressively neglected. Police got progressively nearer to the political party in power and correspondingly farther from the uncommitted general public of the country. Since most of the law and order situations tended to have political overtones, the political party in power got habituated to taking a direct hand in directing and influencing police action in such situations. This has led to considerable misuse of police machinery at the behest of individuals and groups in political circles. Police performance under the compulsions of such an environment has consequently fallen far short of the requirements of law and impartial performance of duties on several occasions.

World - Land and Water Resources at a glanceGeneralA

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1. World - Land and Water Resources at a glance
GeneralA
Sources of Water (Approximate) Item Volume (Million BCM) Salt Water in Oceans 1348 Fresh Water 37.5 B. Sources of Fresh Water (Approximate) Item Volume ('000 BCM) Polar Ice and Glaciers 28200 Ground Water < 800 m deep 3740 800 - 4000 m deep 4710 Lakes and Rivers 127 Others (soil moisture and atmospheric vapors) 704

Water in Indian Constitution

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The Constitution of India lays down the legislative and functional jurisdiction of the Union, State and local Governments regarding 'Water'. Under the scheme of the Constitution, 'Water' is basically a State subject and the Union comes in only in the case of inter- state river waters. List II of the Seventh Schedule, dealing with subjects regarding which states have jurisdiction, has the following as Entry 17 :
"Water, that is to say, water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, water storage and water power subject to the provisions of Entry 56 of List I Entry 56 of List I (Union list), reads as follows: "Regulation and development of inter- state rivers and river valleys to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union, is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest".
The Constitution has a specific article (Article 262), dealing with adjudication of disputes relating to matters of inter- state rivers or river valleys, which reads as follows:
Article 262 (1): Parliament may by law provide for the adjudication on any dispute or complaint with respect to the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, any inter- state river or river valley.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may by law provide that neither the Supreme Court nor any other Court shall exercise jurisdiction in respect of any such dispute or complaint as is referred to in clause (1).
The recent 1992 amendments to the Constitution regarding Panchayats and Municipalities introduced the following entries in the schedules listing the subject-areas in which the State Governments and legislatures may devolve functions to such bodies, so as to make them evolve as local self-governing institutions: In the Eighth Schedule (Part IX) dealing with Panchayats, the subjects, ''Minor irrigation, Water management and Watershed development", "drinking water" and "maintenance of community assets" are listed. In the Twelfth Schedule (Part IX A) dealing with municipalities, the subjects "water supply of domestic, industrial and commercial purposes" is listed. Functional responsibilities are, thus, visualised for local Governments in respect of several aspects of water use.
The two laws enacted by the Union under Article 262 and Entry 56 of List I are the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 (as amended up to 1980) and the River Boards Act, 1956. In recent years since the Constitution does not have an entry relating to 'Environment', using the residual powers, the Union has enacted laws on environment and control of pollution, which have effect on water use including ground water and its exploitation. A large number of Acts dealing with irrigation, canals and their maintenance, water rates and cess, command area development and maintenance of tanks are in force in each state. Some of the Acts are as old as the 1860s and 70s.

NHRC GUIDELINES REGARDING ARREST

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Need for Guidelines:Arrest involves restriction of liberty of a person arrested and therefore, infringes the basic human rights of liberty. Nevertheless the Constitution of India as well as International human rights law recognise the power of the State to arrest any person as a part of its primary role of maintaining law and order. The Constitution requires a just, fair and reasonable procedure established by law under which alone such deprivation of liberty is permissible.Although Article 22(1) of the Constitution provides that every person placed under arrest shall be informed as soon as may be the ground of arrest and shall not be denied the right to consult and be defended by a lawyer of his choice and S.50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. PC) requires a police officer arresting any person to “forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest”. in actual practice these requirements are observed more in the breach. Likewise, the requirement of production of the arrested person before the court promptly which is mandated both under the Constitution [Article22(2)] and the Cr. PC (Section 57] is also not adhered to strictly.A large number of complaints pertaining to Human Rights violations are in the area of abuse of police powers, particularly those of arrest and detention. It has, therefore, become necessary, with a view to narrowing the gap between law and practice, to prescribe guidelines regarding arrest even while at the same time not unduly curtailing the power of the police to effectively maintain and enforce law and order and proper investigation.
PRE-ARREST The power to arrest without a warrant should be exercised only after a reasonable satisfaction is reached, after some investigation, as to the genuineness and bonafides of a complaint and a reasonable belief as to both the person’s complicity as well as the need to effect arrest. [Joginder Kumar's case- (1994) 4 SCC 260).Arrest cannot be justified merely on the existence of power, as a matter of law, to arrest without a warrant in a cognizable case. After Joginder Kumar's pronouncement of the Supreme Court the question whether the power of arrest has been exercised reasonably or not is clearly a justiciable one.Arrest in cognizable cases may be considered justified in one or other of the following circumstances:(i) The case involves a grave offence like murder, dacoity, robbery, rape etc. and it is necessary to arrest the suspect to prevent him from escaping or evading the process of law.(ii) The suspect is given to violent behaviour and is likely to commit further offences.(iii) The suspect requires to be prevented from destroying evidence or interfering with witnesses or warning other suspects who have not yet been arrested.(iv) The suspect is a habitual offender who, unless arrested, is likely to commit similar or further offences. [3rd Report of National Police Commission] Except in heinous offences, as mentioned above, an arrest must be avoided if a police officer issues notice to the person to attend the police station and not leave the station without permission. (see Joginder Kumar’s case (1994) SCC 260). The power to arrest must be avoided where the offences are bailable unless there is a strong apprehension of the suspect absconding . Police officers carrying out an arrest or interrogation should bear clear identification and name tags with designations. The particulars of police personnel carrying out the arrest or interrogation should be recorded contemporaneously, in a register kept at the police station.
ARREST As a rule use of force should be avoided while effecting arrest. However, in case of forcible resistance to arrest, minimum force to overcome such resistance may be used. However, care must be taken to ensure that injuries to the person being arrested, visible or otherwise, is avoided. The dignity of the person being arrested should be protected. Public display or parading of the person arrested should not be permitted at any cost. Searches of the person arrested must be done with due respect to the dignity of the person, without force or aggression and with care for the person’s right to privacy. Searches of women should only be made by other women with strict regard to decency. (S.51(2) Cr.PC.) The use of handcuffs or leg chains should be avoided and if at all, it should be resorted to strictly in accordance with the law repeatedly explained and mandated in judgment of the Supreme Court in Prem Shanker Shukla v. Delhi Administration [(1980) 3 SCC 526] and Citizen for Democracy v. State of Assam[(1995) 3 SCC 743].As far as is practicable women police officers should be associated where the person or persons being arrested are women. The arrest of women between sunset and sunrise should be avoided.Where children or juveniles are sought to be arrested, no force or beatings should be administered under any circumstances. Police Officers, may for this purpose, associate respectable citizens so that the children or juveniles are not terrorised and minimal coercion is used.Where the arrest is without a warrant, the person arrested has to be immediately informed of the grounds of arrest in a language which he or she understands. Again, for this purpose, the police, if necessary may take the help of respectable citizens. These grounds must have already been recorded in writing in police records. The person arrested should be shown the written reasons as well and also given a copy on demand. (S.50(1) Cr.PC.)The arrested person can, on a request made by him or her, demand that a friend, relative or other person known to him be informed of the fact of his arrest and the place of his detention. The police should record in a register the name of the person so informed. [Joginder Kumar's case (supra)].If a person is arrested for a bailable offence, the police officer should inform him of his entilement to be released on bail so that he may arrange for sureties. (S.50(2) Cr.PC.)Apart from informing the person arrested of the above rights, the police should also inform him of his right to consult and be defended by a lawyer of his choice. He should also be informed that he is entitled to free legal aid at state expense [D.K. Basu's case (1997) 1 SCC].When the person arrested is brought to the police station, he should, if he makes a request in this regard, be given prompt medical assistance. He must be informed of this right. Where the police officer finds that the arrested person is in a condition where he is unable to make such request but is in need of medical help, he should promptly arrange for the same. This must also be recorded contemporaneously in a register. The female requesting for medical help should be examined only by a female registered medical practitioner. (S.53 Cr.PC.)Information regarding the arrest and the place of detention should be communicated by the police officer effecting the arrest without any delay to the police Control Room and District / State Headquarters. There must be a monitoring mechanism working round the clock.As soon as the person is arrested, police officer effecting the arrest shall make a mention of the existence or non-existence of any injury(s) on the person of the arrestee in the register of arrest. If any injuries are found on the person of the arrestee, full description and other particulars as to the manner in which the injuries were caused should be mentioned in the register, which entry shall also be signed by the police officer and the arrestee. At the time of release of the arrestee, a certificate to the above effect under the signature of the police officer shall be issued to the arrestee.If the arrestee has been remanded to police custody under the orders of the court, the arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by a trained Medical Officer every 48 hours during his detention in custody by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health Services of the concerned State or Union Territory. At the time of his release from the police custody, the arrestee shall be got medically examined and a certificate shall be issued to him stating therein the factual position of the existence or nonexistence of any injuries on his person.
POST ARRESTThe person under arrest must be produced before the appropriate court within 24 hours of the arrest (Ss 56 and 57 Cr.PC).The person arrested should be permitted to meet his lawyer at any time during the interrogation. The interrogation should be conducted in a clearly identifiable place, which has been notified for this purpose by the Government. The place must be accessible and the relatives or friend of the person arrested must be informed of the place of interrogation taking place. The methods of interrogation must be consistent with the recognised rights to life, dignity and liberty and right against torture and degrading treatment.
ENFORCEMENT OF GUIDELINES1. The guidelines must be translated in as many languages as possible and distributed to every police station. It must also be incorporated in a handbook which should be given to every policeman.2. Guidelines must receive maximum publicity in the print or other electronic media. It should also be prominently displayed on notice board, in more than one language, in every police station.3. The police must set up a complaint redressal mechanism, which will promptly investigate complaints of violation of guidelines and take corrective action.4 The notice board which displays guidelines must also indicate the location of the complaints redressal mechanism and how that body can be approached.5. NGOs and public institutions including courts, hospitals, universities etc., must be involved in the dissemination of these guidelines to ensure the widest possible reach.6. The functioning of the complaint redressal mechanism must be transparent and its reports accessible.7. Prompt action must be taken against errant police officers for violation of the guidelines. This should not be limited to departmental enquiries but also set in motion the criminal justice mechanism.8. Sensitisation and training of police officers is essential for effective implementation of the guidelines.

Why is the media here so negative?

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Why is the media here so negative?Why are we in India so embarrassed to recognize our own strengths, our achievements?We are such a great nation. We have so many amazing success stories but we refuse to acknowledge them. Why?We are the first in milk production.We are number one in Remote sensing satellites.We are the second largest producer of wheat.We are the second largest producer of rice.Look at Dr. Sudarshan , he has transferred the tribal village into a self-sustaining, self-driving unit. There are millions of such achievements but our media is only obsessed in the bad news and failures and disasters.I was in Tel Aviv once and I was reading the Israeli newspaper. It was the day after a lot of attacks and bombardments and deaths had taken place. The Hamas had struck. But the front page of the newspaper had the picture of a Jewish gentleman who in five years had transformed his desert into an orchid and a granary. It was this inspiring picture that everyone woke up to. The gory details of killings, bombardments, deaths, were inside in the newspaper, buried among other news.

In India we only read about death, sickness, terrorism, crime.. Why are we so NEGATIVE? Another question: Why are we, as a nation so obsessed with foreign things? We want foreign T.Vs, we want foreign shirts. We want foreign technology. Why this obsession with everything imported. Do we not realize that self-respect comes with self-reliance? I was in Hyderabad giving this lecture, when a 14 year old girl asked me for my autograph. I asked her what her goal in life is. She replied: I want to live in a developed India . For her, you and I will have to build this developed India . You must proclaim. India is not an under-developed nation; it is a highly developed nation.Do you have 10 minutes? Allow me to come back with a vengeance.
Got 10 minutes for your country? If yes, then read; otherwise, choice is yours..YOU say that our government is inefficient.YOU say that our laws are too old.YOU say that the municipality does not pick up the garbage.YOU say that the phones don't work, the railways are a joke. The airline is the worst in the world, mails never reach their destination. YOU say that our country has been fed to the dogs and is the absolute pits.
YOU say, say and say. What do YOU do about it?
Take a person on his way to Singapore . Give him a name - 'YOURS'. Give him a face - 'YOURS'. YOU walk out of the airport and you are at your International best. In Singapore you don't throw cigarette butts on the roads or eat in the stores. YOU are as proud of their Underground links as they are.. You pay $5 (approx. Rs. 60) to drive through Orchard Road (equivalent of Mahim Causeway or Pedder Road) between 5 PM and 8 PM. YOU come back to the parking lot to punch your parking ticket if you have over stayed in a restaurant or a shopping mall irrespective of your status identity… In Singapore you don't say anything, DO YOU? YOU wouldn't dare to eat in public during Ramadan, in Dubai .. YOU would not dare to go out without your head covered in Jeddah.YOU would not dare to buy an employee of the telephone exchange in London at 10 pounds (Rs.650) a month to, 'see to it that my STD and ISD calls are billed to someone else.'YOU would not dare to speed beyond 55 mph (88 km/h) in Washington and then tell the traffic cop, 'Jaanta hai main kaun hoon (Do you know who I am?). I am so and so's son. Take your two bucks and get lost.' YOU wouldn't chuck an empty coconut shell anywhere other than the garbage pail on the beaches in Australia and New Zealand ..Why don't YOU spit Paan on the streets of Tokyo ? Why don't YOU use examination jockeys or buy fake certificates in Boston ??? We are still talking of the same YOU. YOU who can respect and conform to a foreign system in other countries but cannot in your own. You who will throw papers and cigarettes on the road the moment you touch Indian ground. If you can be an involved and appreciative citizen in an alien country, why cannot you be the same here in India ?
In America every dog owner has to clean up after his pet has done the job. Same in Japan ..Will the Indian citizen do that here?' He's right. We go to the polls to choose a government and after that forfeit all responsibility.We sit back wanting to be pampered and expect the government to do everything for us whilst our contribution is totally negative. We expect the government to clean up but we are not going to stop chucking garbage all over the place nor are we going to stop to pick a up a stray piece of paper and throw it in the bin. We expect the railways to provide clean bathrooms but we are not going to learn the proper use of bathrooms.We want Indian Airlines and Air India to provide the best of food and toiletries but we are not going to stop pilfering at the least opportunity.This applies even to the staff who is known not to pass on the service to the public.
When it comes to burning social issues like those related to women, dowry, girl child! and others, we make loud drawing room protestations and continue to do the reverse at home. Our excuse? 'It's the whole system which has to change, how will it matter if I alone forego my sons' rights to a dowry.' So who's going to change the system?What does a system consist of? Very conveniently for us it consists of our neighbours, other households, other cities, other communities and the government. But definitely not me and YOU. When it comes to us actually making a positive contribution to the system we lock ourselves along with our families into a safe cocoon and look into the distance at countries far away and wait for a Mr.Clean to come along & work miracles for us with a majestic sweep of his hand or we leave the country and run away.Like lazy cowards hounded by our fears we run to America to bask in their glory and praise their system. When New York becomes insecure we run to England . When England experiences unemployment, we take the next flight out to the Gulf. When the Gulf is war struck, we demand to be rescued and brought home by the Indian government. Everybody is out to abuse and rape the country. Nobody thinks of feeding the system. Our conscience is mortgaged to money.
Dear Indians, The article is highly thought inductive, calls for a great deal of introspection and pricks one's conscience too…. I am echoing J. F. Kennedy's words to his fellow Americans to relate to Indians…..
'ASK WHAT WE CAN DO FOR INDIA AND DO WHAT HAS TO BE DONE TO MAKE INDIA WHAT AMERICA AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE TODAY'
Lets do what India needs from us.
Forward this mail to each Indian for a change instead of sending Jokes or junk mails.
Thank you,
Dr.. Abdul Kalam

Challenges and the Saving Grace

2010-01-26T03:38:00.000-08:00

Challenges in the path of stamping out the evil of corruption are but formidable. Black money, an outright ominous end product of the whole gamut of corruptions, has come to account for 40 per cent of the Gross Domestic Products (GDP).[xii] Unverifiable reports simultaneously suggests that unscrupulous industrialists, scandalous politicians and corrupt officers have since put in about US$ 1500 billion in their private foreign accounts, which they have quite necessarily been misappropriating from time to time. The worse that the matter more often than not languishes on one excuse or the other for unimaginable period, which provides uncalled for sanctuary the perpetrators. One of the hurdles constituted of immunity provisions. One could now see silver lining after the “prior sanction provision” under Section 19 of The Prevention of Corruption Act – 1988 has been blown away and Section 197 Cr P C made redundant.
There is a saving grace that the world view of an average Indian is averse of vices. The broad masses of the people have a simple task to ask for transparency, accept the verdict as the rule of the game what they otherwise do in the name of their fate, burn the real life demon what they do with the mythological ones and last but not the least, get to zero tolerance for the perpetrators beyond all bounds of personal links and likes. Operational side of the campaign calls for making the institutions of democracy efficient. It will handle much of the nexus of political, bureaucratic and criminal elements in the country.

Framework of the Control Mechanism and the Slip Points

2010-01-26T03:37:00.000-08:00

Discussions, as such, bear out abiding and ever increasing nature of the phenomenon. It also speaks of its unmistakable resilience to most, if not all statutory and legal safeguards in place. It is both about the political and bureaucratic actors, who tend to transgress their oath of honesty and integrity. It is symptomatic of multi level chinks in the framework of the control mechanism. In over all perspectives, it speaks of system fragility to face onslaughts of individual as much as organized orgies.
The existing check points against political operatives constitute first, the public platform of elections. The second and subsequent check points constitute of provisions of mid course intermediate and final corrections, available with the two respective houses of the Legislature at the national and provincial levels. There are then scores of statutory independent bodies including the judiciary to call the shots. Notwithstanding, there is in place the institutions of Lokpal and Lokayuktas to get to investigate and redress public grievances about corruption, favouritism and official indiscipline in administrative machinery. There impeachment provisions in respect of certain set of functionaries as well.
There are then service and/ or profession disciplining authorities in the case of bureaucrats, professionals and business persons.[ix] This is besides well set common laws. The Government of India, notwithstanding, has set up the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) to advice the government, government institutions and departments in planning, executing and reforming their vigilance works. The CVC, in turn, has taken a number of steps including the task of interfacing with people at large through a website to get to the broad and specifics of the inside out to perform its charters.[x] Council for Clean India (CFCI), an initiative of the CVC, has been in vogue for nearly decade to get much of the catalysts on one platform to work for prevention of the dreaded evil of corruption.[xi]
The slips in the system, notwithstanding, rule the roost. One of the discernible symptoms of the phenomenon constitutes of disproportionate assets (DA), which, literally, goes along as a rule in proportion to the level of authority in decision making. The change phenomenon, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, tend to exemplify a case of one time locale specific cottage industry of delinquent action assuming subsequently the form and shape of all pervasive heavy industry with ancillaries all over the country. The perpetrators, in particular the political persons, tend to enact phoenix. Even while indicted and prosecuted, they hold potentials to romp back in public life, using different tantrum.

Intensity of Corruptions and the Intervening Factors

2010-01-26T03:36:00.000-08:00

While few and far between, the instances of one or the other kind of the three sets of corruption in the Indian public office did come up even during the early years of independence. A.D Gorwala Report (1951) and Santhanam Committee Report (1964) pointed fingers at the integrity of ministers and civil servants. The reports speak of relative tolerance and shielding of the miscreants. Enriching themselves through illegitimate means, practicing nepotism and securing good jobs and business options for their children and relatives and reaping other advantages inconsistent with any standard of purity then constituted common refrain among the deviants. Factors at work included a web of restrictive rules and regulation regime in face a general resource and opportunity crunch in the economy and rise of power brokers, who, at one end, served as necessary link between the system and the clientele, and thus, bore mantle of legitimate go between and on the other end, created system glitch to transparent transactions. In the bargain, discretionary powers at different ends of power centers, subject to corruptibility quotient of the individual player and accountability glitch in the system, turned out to be the fountain head of corrupt practices in governance.
Indian state and its institutions were then in a nascent state. However, the responses were quite straight and stringent. While not exhaustive, the system response to some of the often quoted corruption cases of the era such as Jeep Scandal (1948), Mudgal case (1951); LIC-Mundhra deals (1957); Partap Singh Kairon case (1964); and, Biju Patnaik case (1965) stand testimony.
The Jeep Scandal, so to say, related to V.K Krishna Menon, the then Indian High Commissioner UK. The Indian army had placed orders for procurement of 155 Jeeps worth Rs 8 millions. They were to be used in then troubled Hyderabad and Kashmir regions. The Indian army had placed services of a Brigadier, which he bypassed and instead outsourced through an agent, Cleminsan. While the roadworthiness of the Jeeps in question was certified by Lloyds, the sulking Indian Army made an issue in accepting, and the opposition, in particular those who were ranged against the then Prime Minister Pt Jawaharlal Nehru blew it out. Even as the Jeeps remained on road for over a decade, V.K Krishna Menon, one of the most austere political people of the time, suffered the insinuation.
H.G Mudgal, a Member of Parliament, accepted Rs 1000 each on two occasions in his dealings with Bullion Merchant Association. On receiving complaints, the then Prime Minister first approached Speaker G.V. Mavalankar for a thorough parliamentary enquiry. A member of Lok Sabha wanted reference of the case to the Privilege Committee. The Speaker did not find it workable. The Prime Minister moved a resolution for appointment of an Ad-hoc Committee of the Parliament to go into the issue, which found his conduct "derogatory to the dignity of the House and inconsistent with the standards of member of Parliament”. He was formally expelled from the House.
LIC-Mundhra deal remains a legend by its own right. It was the first financial scandal of independent India. With his connections, Haridas Mundhra, a Kolkata based industrialist and stock speculator, got Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) to invest Rs. 1.24 crores (US$ 3.2 millions) in the shares of his six troubled companies such as Richardson Cruddas, Jessops & Company, Smith Stanistreet, Osler Lamps, Agnelo Brothers and British India Corporation. The investment was done under governmental pressure and bypassed the LIC’s investment committee, which was informed of this decision only after the deal had gone through. In the event, LIC lost most of the money. The irregularity was brought to the notice of the Lok Sabha by the ruling party member Feroze Gandhi, the son-in-law of the then Prime Minister. The matter was disposed in record 24 day inquiry by one-man Committee of Justice MC Chagla. Haridas Mundhra was sentenced to imprisonment. The Committee found the Finance Minister T.T Krishnamachari constitutionally responsible. He subsequently resigned. The Committee recommended trial of Finance Secretary, H. M. Patel, along with two LIC officials, L S Vaidyanathan for suspected collusion. The incident turned to be the harbinger for the coming up of statutory Central Vigilance Commission to play a pivotal role looking into the phenomenon.
Partap Singh Kairon was Chief Minister of Punjab from 1956 to 1964. While he is credited for much of the developments the state achieved, the controversy about his corrupt actions in promoting the economic interests of his sons, relatives and cohorts transcended beyond the epoch of the first Prime Minister of India. In close contrast to all other cases that found logical end, his assassination in February 1965, just two months after he resigned after being indicted by the S.R Das Commission, closed the chapter.[v] The case of Orissa Chief Minister Biju Patnaik did not as well have a logical end.. After a long time, charges of corruption against him were investigated by HR Khanna Commission. He was indicted for awarding government contract to his privately held companies and was forced to resign.
There were some lesser known cases of corruption of the kind in the early years of independence. They included: Cycle Imports scandal (1951); BHU Funds scandal (1956); and, Teja Loans case (1960). S.A. Venkataraman, the then Secretary, the Union Ministry of Commerce and Industry was proceeded against and later jailed for accepting a bribe in lieu of granting a cycle import quota to a company. BHU fund scandal was then first of its kind in an educational institution. The employees had misappropriated Rs 5 millions. Once found guilty by the court of laws, the perpetrators had to under go imprisonments. Shipping magnate Jayant Dharma Teja took loans worth Rs 20.2 millions to establish the Jayanti Shipping Company. In 1960, the authorities discovered that he was actually siphoning off money to his own account, after which Teja fled the country.
The situation, in subsequent decades, witnessed a sea change, in particular in the mode, scope and end results. The political class and the civil servants literally came to operate in a sort of network orgies in contrast to individual aberrations during the early years. There are individual political players, in certain cases the political entity of their affiliations, who once vowed to fight pitched political battles with no holds barred to expose and eradicate corruptions in high places, carried out and let their kin to pursue the same course. Much the same could be said about the bureaucracy.[vi]
For a variety of reasons, in 1970’s, despite outcry of a different order, the number of corruption cases, then making headlines in substance, were just handful. The case of public sector Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), which awarded contracts worth Rs 20.2 millions for supply of petroleum products at constant price in an epoch of falling prices to a Hong Kong based said to be non-existent Kuo Oil Co in 1976 is one onstance. Political storm, nevertheless took place on couple of other occasions.[vii]
1980s brought a spate of cases, the major ones were: Antulay Trust scandal (1981), Lakhubhai Pathak cheating scandal (1983) Bofors Pay-Off (1986), HDW Commissions (1987), and St Kitts Forgery (1989). Things were little different in 1990’s. Counts went up. Airbus Scandal (1990); Solanki Exposé (1992); Securities Scam (1992); Indian Bank Rip-off (1992); Hawala scandal (1993), Sugar Import (1994); JMM Bribes (1995); Lakhubhai Pathak Paper Pulp Contract Bribery (1996); Telcom Scam (1996); Urea Deal (1996); and Coffingate (1999). The notable cases during the first decade of the new millennium included: Tehelka Sting (2001); Stock Market Scam (2001); Home Trade Scam (2002); Stamp Paper Scam (2003); Oil-for-Food Scandal (2005); Cash for Query (2005) ; MPLADS Scam (2005) Human Trafficking Forged Passport Scam (2007); Cash for Votes Scam (2008) and Satyam Computers (2008).
The list is not comprehensive. They are nor representative of different sets of orgies. There are quite a large number of exposes, both in all India and state level cases, some of which are being tried inconclusively as matters of disproportionate assets (DA). Leave aside glaring faults in the surveys of some of the professional bodies in bracketing India vis-à-vis different countries in regional and global perspectives on the basis of ill defined corruption perception index (CPI), the sweep of the phenomenon is simply astounding and tend to affect millions of people in their every day lives.[viii] The bureaucratic core to the phenomenon is much more virulent. It figures grand, middle or petty on the scale of 10 in different situations, depending on levels of control in the transaction of individual job. Levels of transparency figuring respectively nil, least and quite reckonable again on the scale of 10, depending on the levels of absoluteness with quantum of discretions in decision making go in chartering the orgies.

India’s fighting Corruption Menace

2010-01-26T03:35:00.001-08:00

Corruption has come to make headlines more often now than ever. Political elite acquired notoriety much before the dawn of independence.[i] It is not again just the treasury benches. The dynamics of corruption transcend gender, social and economic dimensions and closer to Gunnar Myrdal’s electrifying description of “folk lore of corruptions. Public perceptions, in its generality, hold bureaucrats, business persons, NGOs, and last but not the least, criminals as critical perpetrators of the phenomenon. There are then strikingly rich, articulate and connected set of professionals, who make, mend and mar every public debate, discourse and decision but have lent helping hands as agent provocateurs.[ii]
There is literal dearth of micro study to portray of an all pervasive account of the scenario. While conceptually handicapped in more than one respect, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), brought out by Transparency International (TI), does capture a panoramic view of the malaise. There is an unspoken truth in the findings that the citizens pay bribes to avail essential public services for their survival.[iii] Of the two sets of “need based” and “basic” services, the former has been seen as more corrupt. The need based services primarily cover income tax, police and judiciary. Monopolistic nature provisioning of these services stand at the root of the problem. Basic services include health and education. The citizens have choice to opt out for competitive private owned and run institutions. However, the poor have no choice. Notwithstanding, as a large part of public spending on welfare and development programmes do not reach the target group. Of many a manifest outcome of the phenomenon, the low benefit quotient of programmes and project have had abiding adverse impacts on the socio-economic life of the people.
The paper, in its perspective, deliberates over the institutional response and efficacy of the system to handle the problem of corruption. The assumptions include: First, the phenomenon of corruption in Indian public life crept despite the Indian Statute and the age old social value system . Second, the outgrowth and sustenance much less perpetuation and oblique social acceptance of the phenomenon draw on a variety of factors, some of which are universal while others quite exclusive to India; Third, the glitch in the organization and management of public utility services, law enforcement mechanism and check and balance system stand at the back of much of delinquent behaviour of different actors in the game; and, Fourth, a web of visible/invisible watchdogs, operating through and from the sanctum sanctorum of social, cultural and spiritual institutions in close coordination with legal system to instil transparency, integrity and accountability in the attitude and practices at large hold real and ultimate answer to the menace. The paper, in its perspective, sequentially focuses on: Forms of Corruption and the Milieu; Intensity of Corruptions and the Intervening Factors; Control Mechanism and the Slip Points; and, Challenges and the Saving Grace.
Forms of Corruptions and the Milieu
Strange and yet true - the Indian public life is severely infested with the phenomenon of corruption. In his disquiet, the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi saw symptoms of “institutionalization of corruption” as an outcome of “corrupting of institutions” right in 1985. “The failure to deal with corruption”, said he,” has bred contempt for the law”. This is there despite the age old wisdom of the land and present day statutory organizational framework of governance of the nation squarely provides for zero tolerance.[iv] However, the new developments in the socio-economic organization of the nation, in particular the importance of material existence and a number of glitches in the operating system and procedure, seem to have gone into creating aberrations.
Forms of corruptions, taking place in India, qualify much of what scholarship in the field otherwise tend to suggest. The phenomenon, as elsewhere relates to abuse of “public office for private gains”. In all such events, as the TI elaborates, the public servants, be it politicians or civil servants undertake improper and unlawful means to enrich themselves or those close to them, by virtue of extraordinary power of discretion handed down to them. Arnold J. Heidenheimer spoke of three types of corrupt behaviour: First, the public office centered; Second, the market centered; and, Third, the public power centered. In the case of public centered corruptions, the perpetrators ordinarily violated public trust placed in their office. The delinquent behaviour included bribery, nepotism and misappropriation. In market centered corruptions, the officials look upon their authority to maximize personal gains by dispensing public benefits. Quite in the same vein, where it related public power centered corruptions, the officials tend to violate common interest that provides direct or indirect benefits to the perpetrators in the last go. Pioneering Indian contributors to the concern add up to corrupt business persons, corrupt non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and criminals in the category of persons while.. As public servants remain the fountain heads of violations, the Heidenheimer typology remains sacrosanct.

Corruption: Some more facts

2010-01-26T03:33:00.000-08:00

The two sentences preceding the last two sentences of the Editorial ``Probing the allegations'' (March 19)read as under: ``Mr. Fernandes' lengthy and emotional defence on television is unconvincing because it fails to answer the fundamental questions. How the man he personally selected as his party's treasurer could brag of firing specific defence deals, why bundles of notes were accepted at his official residence from someone posing as an arms seller and how the Ministry he presided over could be so easily penetrated by middlemen and a couple of investigative journalists''.
Through these, you have conveyed to the readers through the editorial the astonishing piece of information that ``bundles of notes were accepted'' at the official residence of the Defence Minister - something which has not been reported. What has been shown in the tapes and reported in TheHinduis that Ms. Jaya Jaitly, Samata party president, was seen talking to the investigative journalists posing as arms dealers at the Defence Minister's official residence and at one time, when they offered a donation to the party, they were told to give it to the party office-bearer, Mr. Srinivasa Prasada.
Unlike in Mr. Bangaru Laxman's residence where bundles of notes were seen being accepted by him and put away, nowhere has it been seen or reported that bundles of notes passed hands at the Defence Minister's residence. Offer of money and its acceptance in so many words is one thing, actual delivery of bundles of notes and their acceptance is another.

History of CORRUPTION in India

2010-01-26T03:29:00.000-08:00

Old-timers will have no difficulty in recalling the `jeep scandal' which erupted when the inimitable V. K. Krishna Menon was the Indian High Commissioner in Britain. Curiously, the scandal related to purchase of jeeps for the Indian Army.
When Krishna Menon's detractors assailed him, the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, defended him by saying that the only scandal about it was that it had been called a scandal.
In the wake of the Chinese aggression in 1962, Nehru thundered in Parliament that not a blade of grass grew in those regions. However, V. K. Krishna Menon, then Defence Minister, stepped down from office but the Government continued in office. Even in the earlier infamous Mundhra LIC deal, the then Finance Minister, T. T. Krishnamachari, alone was asked to resign; the Government appointed the Justice Chagla Commission of Enquiry and chose to continue in office.
In the light of these standards of morality practised by the Congress party in the not too remote past, its call for the resignation of the Vajpayee Government on moral grounds is nothing but hypocrisy and duplicity put together.
The tactic of the Congress and other Opposition parties in obstructing and stalling the Parliament proceedings is only a foul means adopted to achieve what they cannot achieve by fair means, apart from being a grossly undemocratic way of rendering a duly-elected and constituted Parliament disfunctional.

NHRC GUIDELINES REGARDING ARREST

2010-01-26T03:25:00.000-08:00

MWS Launches New Ad Campaign For Brand Mediabharti.com

2009-11-06T23:28:00.000-08:00

Faridabad (India) (Mediabharti Syndication Service) 07 November:
Mediabharti Web Solutions launched a new advertisement campaign with a tagline ‘News, Views & Analysis 24x7’ for its brand ‘Mediabharti.com’.The creatives are in the size of 336*280, 250*250, 728*90 and 468*60 pixels.The creatives to promote the entire portal reflects Mediabharti.com's global reach and a serious endeavor to offer a wide range of inputs to provide a total package tailor-made to suit the requirement of viewers and surfers.“Mediabharti.com, the flagship brand of Mediabharti Web Solutions, has shown 250% growth as per the page views, unique page views and viewer’s penetration in last three month. And, on the revenue front, it is 30% growth in last half year” told Dharmendra Kumar, Editor, Mediabharti.com.

नृशंसता से नहीं मारे जा सकते आतंकवादी

2009-09-09T11:28:00.001-07:00

इशरत जहां और तीन अन्य की फर्जी मुठभेड़ पर विवाद के बीच केंद्र ने बुधवार को कहा कि वह
अदालत में दिए गए हलफनामे पर कायम है कि चारों संदिग्ध थे लेकिन यह भी कहा कि
‘‘आतंकवादियों को नृशंसतापूर्वक नहीं मारा जा सकता है।’’ गृह सचिव जीके पिल्लई ने कहा, ‘‘ हमने
शपथपत्र में जो भी कहा है वह गृह मंत्रालय के पास उपलब्ध तथ्यों के आधार पर है, हम हलफनामे
से पीछे नहीं हट रहे हैं।’’ हालांकि उन्होंने कानून की समुचित प्रक्रिया के पालन की ओर संकेत करते
हुए कहा कि ‘‘आतंकवादियों की नृशंसता से हत्या नहीं की जा सकती।’’ पिल्लई ने स्पष्ट किया कि
‘तथाकथित मुठभेड़’ में केंद्रीय एजेंसियों से कोई व्यक्ति शामिल नहीं था।उन्होंने कहा, ‘गृह मंत्रालय का मुठभेड़ से कोई लेना देना नहीं है। हमने खुफिया रिपोटरें के आधार
पर तथ्य दिया। उस आधार पर हमने अदालत में हलफनामा दाखिल किया।’’ पिल्लई ने कहा कि
गृह मंत्रालय मुठभेड़ की हकीकत का फैसला करने के पक्ष में नहीं था और यह पता करना अदालत
का काम है।इशरत जहां और तीन अन्य लोगों की वर्ष 2004 की कथित मुठभेड़ पर नया विवाद पैदा हो गया है
क्योंकि एक न्यायिक रिपोर्ट में कहा गया है कि यह फर्जी थी।

Chronology of human rights

2009-08-29T12:12:00.000-07:00

Chronology of human rights in India1829 - The practice of sati was formally abolished by Governor General William Bentick after years of campaigning by Hindu reform movements such as the Brahmo Samaj of Ram Mohan Roy against this orthodox Hindu funeral custom of self-immolation of widows after the death of their husbands. 1929 - Child Marriage Restraint Act, prohibiting marriage of minors is passed. 1947 - India achieves political independence from the British Raj. 1950 - The Constitution of India establishes a sovereign democratic republic with universal adult franchise. Part 3 of the Constitution contains a Bill of Fundamental Rights enforceable by the Supreme Court and the High Courts. It also provides for reservations for previously disadvantaged sections in education, employment and political representation. 1952 - Criminal Tribes Act 1871 repealed by government, former "criminal tribes" categorized as "denotified" and Habitual Offenders Act (1952) enacted. 1955 - Reform of family law concerning Hindus gives more rights to Hindu women. 1973 - Supreme Court of India rules in Kesavananda Bharati that the basic structure of the Constitution (including many fundamental rights) is unalterable by a constitutional amendment. 1975-77 - State of Emergency in India - extensive rights violations take place. 1978 - SC rules in Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India that the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be suspended even in an emergency. 1984 - Operation Blue Star and the subsequent 1984 Anti-Sikh riots 1985-6 - The Shah Bano case, where the Supreme Court recognised the Muslim woman's right to maintenance upon divorce, sparks protests from Muslim clergy. To nullify the decision of the Supreme Court, the Rajiv Gandhi government enacted The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 1989 - Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is passed. 1989-present - Kashmiri insurgency sees ethnic cleansing of Kashmiri Pandits, desecrating Hindu temples, killing of Hindus and Sikhs, and abductions of foreign tourists and government functionaries. 1992 - A constitutional amendment establishes Local Self-Government (Panchayati Raj) as a third tier of governance at the village level, with one-third of the seats reserved for women. Reservations were provided for scheduled castes and tribes as well. 1992 - Babri Masjid demolished by Hindu mobs, resulting in riots across the country. 1993 - National Human Rights Commission is established under the Protection of Human Rights Act. 2001 - Supreme Court passes extensive orders to implement the right to food.[3] 2002 - Violence in Gujarat, chiefly targeting its Muslim minority, claims many lives. 2005 - A powerful Right to Information Act is passed to give citizen's access to information held by public authorities.[4] 2005 - National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) guarantees universal right to employment. 2006 - Supreme Court orders police reforms in response to the poor human rights record of Indian police.[5]